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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1 - Because Garco failed to appeal the trial court's initial grant of summary 
judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review that order. 
The appellate court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of law that may be raised and 
considered at any stage of the proceedings. Hausknect v. Industrial Commission, 882 P.2d 683, 694 
(Utah App. 1994). 
ISSUE 2 - Garco did not present any new evidence or offer anything other than a rehash 
of old arguments in support of its motion to reconsider. 
The trial court's decision to deny a motion to reconsider will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse 
of discretion. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 fn. 2 (Utah App. 1993); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1994). (Issue preserved at R.453-62.) 
ISSUE 3 - Garco failed to carry its burden on summary judgment to present sufficient 
evidence to warrant a trial on any of the causes of action that it had raised. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and affirmed if the undisputed 
material facts demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is correct as a matter of law. Fashion 
Place Investment, Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah App. 1989). (Issue preserved at 
R.436-40). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. Reagan has an outdoor advertising sign on the property 
immediately to the north of Garco's property, and within 500 feet of Garco's southern property line. 
Because Utah statutes require 500-foot spacing between outdoor advertising signs, Garco cannot 
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contract with any of Reagan's competitors to place a sign on Garco's property. Garco itself had 
benefitted from the 500-foot spacing requirement for a number of years -- Reagan had maintained a sign 
several feet north of Garco's southern property line that had for years prevented Garco's northern 
neighbor from contracting with Reagan or Reagan's competitors to place a sign on its property. But 
because Reagan would not agree to Garco's terms for continued maintenance of a sign on Garco's 
property, Garco told Reagan to remove its sign. 
Reagan did remove its sign from Garco's property and erected its new sign on the northern 
neighbor's property. The new sign is within 500 feet of Garco's southern property line, and Garco's 
neighbor is now the beneficiary of the 500-foot spacing requirement. Unhappy with the effect that the 
500-foot spacing requirement has had on its ability to erect a competing sign, Garco has sued Reagan 
for intentional interference with economic relations, unfair practices and punitive damages. 
As additional castigation, Garco has added claims for trespass and unlawful detainer arising out 
of the underground portion of the sign foundation that Reagan left when it removed its sign from 
Garco's property ~ a foundation that is flat (within 1/4 inch of being level to the ground) and which 
does not interfere with Garco's parking utilization or access to its building (R.133, [^25; R.144-45, 146, 
160) (see, also, Appendix 1 hereto, photos of the foundation provided to the trial court at R.541, pp.5-6 
for illustrative purposes). Reagan had left the foundation in place in response to Garco's concerns that 
its removal might compromise the integrity of Garco's adjacent building foundation (R.191, 253). 
The trial court correctly dismissed each and every one of Garco's claims on summary judgment. 
Unsatisfied with the trial court's ruling, Garco insisted that the trial court reconsider that dismissal. 
Garco then urged the trial court to stay its decision on reconsideration until the Federal District Court 
for the District of Utah could rule on state and federal antitrust claims which Garco had filed against 
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Reagan after the trial court had dismissed Garco's state court claims through its original summary 
judgment ruling. 
The trial court appropriately refused to stay its decision or to reconsider its previous dismissal 
of Garco's claims. Thereafter, Garco appealed only the denial of its motion to reconsider. It is that 
decision of the trial court which is before this Court. (The federal court dismissed Garco's antitrust 
claims in August 1998, ruling that Reagan was entitled to state action immunity with regard to Garco's 
Sherman Act claims.) (Appendix 2 hereto). 
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: Garco's September 10, 1996 complaint asserted five 
causes of action, including intentional interference with economic relations, unfair practices, trespass, 
unlawful detainer, and punitive damages (R.l-5). Reagan stated a counterclaim against Garco for 
breach of a covenant against competition (R.63-65). 
Almost one year after Garco filed its complaint, on August 8,1997, Reagan filed its motion for 
summary judgment with regard to all of Garco's causes of action. Garco timely filed some 70 pages 
of opposition to the motion (R. 196-267). Reagan submitted the motion pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
U.CJ.Admin., on September 12, 1997 (R.305). A hearing was scheduled for November 24, 1997 
(R.357). 
On November 17, 1997, just seven days prior to the hearing on Reagan's motion for summary 
judgment, Garco filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims in the case, including 
Reagan's counterclaim (R.398). Garco submitted two new affidavits (R.361-80), and raised a series 
of new arguments in support of its theory that Reagan's motion was ill-taken, and that Garco should 
be granted summary judgment instead (R.381 -97). 
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At the November 24th hearing, the trial court noted that Garco's cross-motion for summary 
judgment was not before the court (R.525, p.55), and Reagan objected to the affidavits and arguments 
that had been raised in that motion (R.525, p. 14). Nevertheless, in opposition to Reagan's motion, 
Garco argued the new issues at length and relied on the new affidavits (R.525, pp.9-14, 32, 35-36, 38-
39,41-42). 
Ruling from the bench, the trial court granted Reagan's motion for summary judgment, and 
dismissed Garco's complaint in its entirety (R.525, pp.18, 49-59). The trial court's order was entered 
on December 29, 1997 (R.436). 
Although the trial court had fully dismissed Garco's complaint, the order was not final because 
of Reagan's pending counterclaim. U.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b). Garco then filed a "Motion to Revise Order 
and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint." (R.441-52). In its motion, Garco relied on its 
previous summary judgment materials, and elaborated on issues that it had previously raised in 
opposition to Reagan's motion for summary judgment (R.441-48). In its reply memorandum in support 
of its reconsideration motion, Garco raised a series of new arguments (R.446-78). On the same day that 
it filed its reply memorandum, Garco filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Utah asserting antitrust violations against Reagan (R.480-88). Garco attached a copy of that complaint 
to its reply memorandum. Id. As an alternative to an outright reconsideration of the prior grant of 
summary judgment in Reagan's favor, Garco asked the trial court to stay its decision on the 
reconsideration motion pending the outcome of the federal court case (R.477).1 Reagan filed a motion 
to strike the new arguments that Garco had raised for the first time in its reply memo, and objected to 
1
 The federal court dismissed Garco's Sherman Act claims in full in August 1998, as barred by 
the state action doctrine. (Appendix 2 hereto). 
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any stay of the state court proceedings (R.489-90). On May 1, 1998, the trial court entered its Order 
granting Reagan's motion to strike. In the same Order, the trial court denied Garco's motion to 
reconsider (R.519-20). The trial court also entered a separate order on May 1st dismissing Reagan's 
counterclaim pursuant to stipulation of the parties. (R.517-18). 
Garco filed its Notice of Appeal on June 1, 1998, stating that it was appealing from "the final 
order of the Hon. William B. Bohling entered in this matter on May 1, 1998." Garco's Notice of 
Appeal did not indicate which of the two May 1st orders it was appealing. In its docketing statement, 
Garco clarified that it was appealing the May 1st Order that had denied the stricken portions of Garco's 
reply memorandum and had denied Garco's motion to reconsider. Garco also indicated in its docketing 
statement that it was appealing the trial court's December 29, 1997 Order and Judgment dismissing 
Garco's Complaint, although Garco's Notice of Appeal had not asserted an appeal from that order. 
Reagan filed a "Motion for Partial Summary Disposition or Alternatively to Strike Portions of 
Docketing Statement" on the basis that Garco had not appealed the December 29, 1997 Order and that 
only the May 1, 1998 Order was at issue on appeal. On September 1, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court 
entered its Order deferring a ruling on Reagan's motion. That motion is still pending. The case was 
assigned to the Court of Appeals on October 5, 1998. 
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS. Reagan entered into a lease agreement in 1975 with Garco's 
predecessor-in-interest to the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit (R.l)(Appendix 4). 
Pursuant to the terms of the lease, Reagan erected an outdoor advertising sign on the property (Garco's 
Brief, p. 4). Garco purchased the property in 1990 with the sign in place (R.367) (hereinafter "Garco 
property"). 
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During the early 1990s, Garco and Reagan attempted to negotiate the terms of a new lease (R. 1 -
2). Those negotiations failed, never resulting in a new written lease agreement. On February 23, 1995, 
Garco advised Reagan that it had "elected to pursue other options," and demanded that Reagan remove 
its sign by July 1995 (R.133,Tf21; R.198, f21). As of February 1995, Garco had called several other 
sign companies, intending to have another outdoor advertising sign put up by someone other than 
Reagan - but Garco did not follow-up with any of these sign companies until after Reagan removed 
its sign from Garco's property in June 1995 (R.133 TTJ22-23; R.199 ffij22-23). 
In the meantime, in April 1995, some eight weeks after Garco's advice to Reagan that it was 
pursuing other options, Reagan entered into a lease agreement with Garco's neighbor to the north, 
Mollerup Moving and Storage (hereinafter "Mollerup") (R.191). Neither Reagan nor any of its 
competitors had had a sign on the Mollerup property because the Garco sign was within 500 feet of 
Mollerup's northern boundary line (R.267). With Reagan vacating the Garco property, the spacing 
requirements of Utah's Outdoor Advertising Act would no longer prevent Mollerup from having an 
outdoor advertising sign on its property. Reagan then applied to UDOT for the permits necessary to 
move to the Mollerup property (R.191, [^5; Garco's Brief, p. 10, ^[18). 
Reagan removed the sign face and poles from Garco's property in June 1995. In response to 
Garco's concerns that removal of the foundation might damage its adjacent building (R.253), Reagan 
left the foundation in place (R.191). The foundation was flat (within 1/4 inch of being level to the 
ground), could be utilized for parking, and did not impair access to Garco's adjacent building (R.133, 
f^25; R. 144-45, 146, 168) (See, also, Appendix 1). More than a year after the sign was removed, with 
only the underground foundation remaining, Garco served Reagan with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer 
(R.257). Garco's First and Second Causes of Action of its Complaint were for trespass (R.2-3) and for 
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unlawful detainer (R.3) arising out of the continued presence of the underground foundation on Garco's 
property.2 
By the first of June 1995, Reagan had erected a new outdoor advertising sign on Mollerup's 
property (Garco's Brief, p. 10, TJ19). The Mollerup sign was within 500 feet of Garco's southern 
boundary line (Garco's Brief, p. 5). As the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act requires 500 feet between 
outdoor advertising signs, Garco could not contract with Reagan's competitors for a sign on Garco's 
property (R. 2-3). Garco asserted that Reagan had deliberately placed the new sign on the Mollerup 
property in such a manner as to prevent Garco from contracting with Reagan's competitors, and claimed 
that Reagan had intentionally interfered with Garco's prospective economic relations (R.3-4). Reagan 
denied Garco's assertions, submitting the affidavit of the neighboring property owner to evidence that 
it was the neighbor who had directed the placement of the sign (R. 189-89). Nevertheless, for purposes 
of Reagan's summary judgment motion, both Reagan and the trial court assumed Garco's allegations 
to be true (R.130; R.438). On the basis of Garco's allegations, the trial court dismissed the tort claim, 
ruling that: 
Even if the Court implies as true that [Reagan's] purpose in locating the sign as it did 
on the neighboring property was to prevent [Garco] from erecting its own sign, there is no 
evidence that any injury to [Garco] occasioned by [Reagan's] move of the sign to the 
neighboring property was an end in and of itself, designed to harm [Garco] merely for the sake 
of injury alone. Instead, [Reagan's] move of the sign to its present location constituted 
legitimate competitive activity, consistent with an effort by [Reagan] to achieve the long-range 
economic goal of maximizing its profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by 
2
 The trial court dismissed the trespass claim because it was undisputed that there was a lease 
between Reagan and Garco's predecessor-in-interest, and that the lease did not require Reagan to 
remove the sign foundation or to restore the property to its former condition upon vacating the 
property (R.437). The trial court dismissed the unlawful detainer claim because possession was 
returned to Garco when the sign faces and sign structure were removed in June of 1995 and Garco's 
Notice of Unlawful Detainer was not served until more than a year later. Id. 
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forestalling competitive activity on the [Garco's] property. Thus, there is no evidence of 
improper purpose. 
(R.438). 
The trial court also ruled that there was no evidence of improper means and that Garco had 
failed to take any substantial steps to obtain its own permit until after Reagan applied to UDOT to move 
the sign (R.438). Thus, the trial court dismissed Garco's claim for intentional interference with 
economic relations (R.438). 
Garco's Fourth Cause of Action was an asserted violation of Utah's Unfair Practices Act (R.4), 
which the trial court dismissed because Garco failed to offer any evidence that Reagan had engaged in 
price discrimination or sold anything at less than cost, as the statute requires. (R.439).3 In dismissing 
all of Garco's substantive causes of action, the trial court also dismissed Garco's Fifth Cause of Action 
for punitive damages (R.439). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE 1 - BECAUSE GARCO FAILED TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S INITIAL 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO REVIEW THAT ORDER. 
In its Notice of Appeal, Garco stated that it was appealing the trial court's May 1, 1998 order. 
The May 1st Order had stricken portions of Garco's reply memorandum filed in support of its motion 
to reconsider, and had denied Garco's motion to reconsider the December 29,1997 Order and Judgment 
dismissing Garco's complaint in full. When there is no reference in the notice of appeal to the order 
or judgment with which the appellant takes issue, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
3
 Although Garco claims that it appealed the entirety of Judge Bohling's dismissal of its 
complaint (Garco's Brief, p. 1), Garco's Brief does not address Judge Bohling's dismissal of Garco's 
Fourth Cause of Action for alleged unfair practices. 
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order or judgment on appeal. M.L. andS.L. v. V.H., 894P.2d 1285, 1286, fn.l (Ut.App. 1995). Thus, 
the December 29th Order and Judgment dismissing Garco's complaint is not an issue on this appeal. 
ISSUE 2 - GARCO DID NOT PRESENT ANY NEW EVIDENCE OR OFFER ANYTHING 
OTHER THAN A REHASH OF OLD ARGUMENTS IN ITS MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER. 
A litigant hoping to change a trial court's mind on a motion to reconsider must demonstrate a 
reason for the request. In asking the trial court below to reconsider its prior dismissal of Garco's 
complaint, Garco asserted that it had presented new evidence, and that it had presented the issues in a 
different light. Contrary to Garco's assertion, what Garco had called "new" evidence was not, in fact, 
new. Garco had argued this same evidence to the trial court in opposition to Reagan's summary 
judgment motion. Nor was the evidence anything that Garco could not have presented to the trial court 
at the time of Reagan's summary judgment motion. The evidence was exclusively within Garco's 
control, and it concerned facts that had occurred years earlier. With regard to Garco's claim that it had 
presented matters in a different light, until it filed its final reply memorandum, all Garco did in its 
reconsideration motion was to restate previous theories and elaborate on them. Then, on reply, Garco 
improperly raised a series of new arguments and theories, which the trial court correctly struck as 
improper rebuttal. Under the circumstances, the trial court's refusal to reconsider its dismissal of 
Garco's claims was well within its discretion. 
ISSUE 3 - GARCO FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A TRIAL ON ANY OF 
THE CAUSES OF ACTION THAT IT HAD RAISED. 
Even if the trial court's December 29, 1997 Order and Judgement were before this Court, the 
trial court committed no error in dismissing Garco's claims. In the face of summary judgment, Garco 
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had the burden to come forward with facts sufficient to establish its claims. Garco failed to meet this 
burden. 
With regard to Garco's claims for intentional interference and unfair practices, the trial court 
and Reagan had assumed for purposes of Reagan's motion for summary judgment that the facts that 
Garco had presented in support of its claims were true. But based on those facts, the trial court correctly 
concluded that Reagan was engaging in legitimate competitive activity when it moved its sign to the 
Mollerup property. The trial court also correctly concluded that Garco had not presented any evidence 
that Reagan had utilized improper means in relocating the sign to its present site. And finally, Garco 
had failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence to establish a claim under Utah's Unfair Practices Act. 
Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Garco's claims for intentional interference and unfair practices. 
The trial court also properly dismissed Garco's trespass claim and unlawful detainer claims. 
Reagan was in legal possession of the property when it erected its outdoor advertising sign, and the 
written lease with Garco's predecessor specifically allowed Reagan to place the sign, including its 
foundation, on the property. The lease did not obligate Reagan to restore the premises to their former 
condition when it vacated. Under these circumstances, the law does not make Reagan liable for trespass 
for leaving the foundation when it returned possession of the property to Garco. Courts around the 
country reject common law trespass claims under similar circumstances, even when a former tenant 
leaves hazardous wastes on the property. Reagan simply had no duty under its lease, express or 
implied, to remove the foundation. 
Because Reagan introduced the sign foundation onto the property during the period of its lease 
with Garco's predecessor, the trial court correctly dismissed Garco's trespass claim based on Reagan's 
failure to remove the foundation at the end of the lease. In reaching this decision, the trial court did not 
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need to reach the issue of whether the lease was binding on Garco. But if it were necessary to reach this 
issue, Garco's assertion that it is not subject to the lease is incorrect. Garco had sufficient notice of the 
lease at the time it purchased the property to take subject to the terms of the lease. Although Garco 
knew that Reagan was leasing the property, Garco chose to rely on the statements it alleges its seller 
made about the terms of the lease rather than calling Reagan. Garco's choice did not divest Reagan of 
its valuable property right. Nor did Garco ever introduce any facts to support its claim that the lease 
was procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Garco initially raised this issue only in its final reply 
memorandum in support of its reconsideration motion, and this claim was never properly before the trial 
court. 
The trial court also correctly rejected Garco's unlawful detainer claim. Reagan removed the sign 
face and poles from Garco's property in June 1995, and never thereafter claimed possession to Garco's 
property. Garco served its Notice of Unlawful Detainer more than a year later. Under these facts, 
Garco failed to state a claim for unlawful detainer. 
In the absence of relief on any of the substantive claims, the trial court properly dismissed 
Garco's claim for punitive damages. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 - BECAUSE GARCO FAILED TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S INITIAL 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO REVIEW THAT ORDER. 
In its Brief, Garco has argued that the trial court allegedly erred in entering its December 29, 
1997 Order granting summary judgment and in dismissing Garco's complaint. But Garco did not appeal 
the December 29th Order. This Court therefore has no jurisdiction to consider that order. M.L. andS.L. 
v. V.K, 894 P.2d 1285, 1286, fn.l (Ut.App. 1995). 
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Rule 3(d), U.R. App., requires that a notice of appeal "designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from " Garco's Notice of Appeal stated that it was appealing "the final order of 
the [trial court] entered in this matter on May 1,1998. The appeal is taken from the entire order."4 The 
May 1st Order had denied Garco's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 519-20), but made no reference to 
the December 29, 1997 Order and Judgment (R.436-40) dismissing Garco's complaint. The purpose 
of a Notice of Appeal is to advise the appellate court and the parties what action of the trial court is 
being appealed. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 388 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1964). When there 
is no reference in the notice of appeal to the order or judgment with which the appellant takes issue, the 
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the order or judgment on appeal. M L andS.L. v. V.H., 
894 P.2d at 1286, fn.l (Ut.App. 1995). Thus, the December 29th Order and Judgment is not an issue 
on this appeal. 
Since Garco appealed only the May 1st Order, Garco is limited to arguing to this Court that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying Garco's Motion to Reconsider. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 
694, 697 fn. 2 (Utah App. 1993); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1994) 
(trial court has discretion whether to grant a motion to reconsider). An appellate court does not need 
to reach the merits of the underlying order to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in refusing to reconsider an order. In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 
42 (Utah App. 1988), the Court found no error in the trial court's refusal to reconsider its initial grant 
of summary judgment, Id. at 45, even though the Court went on to overrule the trial court's initial grant 
4
 In fact, two separate orders were entered by the trial court on May 1, 1998. The first order 
denied Garco's Rule 54(b) motion and granted Reagan's motion to strike. The second order 
dismissed Reagan's counterclaim based upon the stipulation of the parties. Garco's Notice of 
Appeal does not differentiate between those two orders, and it was not clear until Garco filed the 
Docketing Statement which of those two orders Garco was appealing. 
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of summary judgment. Id. at 45-48. The appellant in that case, in compliance with Rule 3(d), 
U.R.App.P., had appealed both the order denying consideration and the initial order granting summary 
judgment. Id. at 43. (Certified copies of the James Constructors Notice of Appeal as well as the two 
orders from which that appeal was taken are included collectively in Appendix 3 hereto). 
Garco did not appeal both the May 1st and December 29th Orders. Garco appealed only the May 
1st Order. Thus, pursuant to Rule 3(d), M.L.v. V.H., supra, and James Constructors, the only issue on 
appeal in the instant case is whether the May 1st Order was an abuse of trial court's discretion to deny 
Garco' s motion for reconsideration. 
ISSUE 2 - GARCO DID NOT PRESENT ANY NEW EVIDENCE OR OFFER ANYTHING 
OTHER THAN A REHASH OF OLD ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER. 
While motions to reconsider under U.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b) are allowed in multi-party or multi-
claim cases when a final judgment has not yet been entered, a litigant hoping to change the trial court's 
mind must demonstrate a reason for the request. Factors the trial court may consider include the 
following nonexclusive list: 
(1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there has 
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" 
will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own 
errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,1311 (Utah App. 1994), quoting State v. O 'NeM, 848 
P.2d 694, 697, fn. 2 (Utah App.) cert, den., 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Garco asserted to the trial court 
(although not until its final Reply Memorandum) that its Motion to Reconsider had presented the 
matters in a different light, and that it had presented new evidence that the trial court should consider 
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in order to correct its previous errors and avoid injustice (R. 467). Garco's assertion was simply not 
correct, as the trial court properly ruled. 
A. GARCO PRESENTED NO NEW EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT AVAILABLE 
AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The only "new" evidence that Garco presented in support of its Motion to Reconsider was found 
in the affidavits of Elaine Crossley (R.361-64) and Paul Kingston (R.365-80). Both of those affidavits 
were filed prior to the November 24, 1997 hearing on Reagan's motion for summary judgment. While 
the trial court did indicate that it had not read the affidavits (R.525, p.55), Garco cited to and argued 
from the affidavits at the hearing (R.525, pp.9-10). Thus, the affidavits were effectively before the trial 
court before it granted Reagan's summary judgment motion. 
Even if Garco's counsel had not relied on the affidavits at the hearing on Reagan's motion, this 
is not a circumstance that justifies a reconsideration on the basis of new evidence. While no Utah court 
has ever squarely addressed the issue of what constitutes new evidence for purposes of Rule 54(b), the 
ruling in Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 510 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1973) provides guidance on this 
issue. In Hammer, while affirming the trial court's reversal of its prior denial of summary judgment, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that discovery had been conducted between the time of the first and 
second motions, resulting in new evidence being presented to the court. Id. at 1105. Thus, the 
circumstances presented in the two motions were different, justifying a reconsideration of the trial 
court's prior ruling. Id. In attempting to determine what constitutes new evidence for purposes of a 
statutory juvenile court termination proceeding, the Utah Supreme Court has relied on the case law that 
addresses the issue for purposes of retrial under Rule 59(a)(4), U.R.Civ.P.: 
Evidence must meet several requirements to qualify as newly discovered evidence under 
Rule 59(a)(4). In Barson v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah 1984), we stated 
that the moving party must show that the evidence has three characteristics in order for a new 
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trial to be granted. First, it must be material, competent evidence which is in fact newly 
discovered. Second, it must be such that it could not, by due diligence, have been discovered 
and produced at trial 
In Interest ofS.R., 735 P.2d 53, 57 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, no discovery took place between the time the trial court dismissed Garco's 
claims and the time Garco moved the trial court to reconsider. The evidence was such that it was 
exclusively within Garco's control.5 And it was evidence concerning facts that had occurred years 
earlier (R.361-80). Had Garco wished to present this evidence in opposition to Reagan's initial motion 
for summary judgment, it had every opportunity to do so. Garco had almost a full year to prepare its 
case before Reagan filed its motion for summary judgment. Garco then presented some 70 pages of 
opposition to Reagan's motion (R. 196-267). The purported "new" evidence that Garco submitted on 
reconsideration was exclusively within Garco's control and fully available to Garco at the time it 
presented its opposition to Reagan's motion. The affidavits that Garco urged the trial court to consider 
on reconsideration do not qualify as newly discovered evidence sufficient to require the trial court to 
reconsider its prior ruling. 
B. GARCO'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER WAS LARGELY JUST A REHASH OF 
ARGUMENTS IT HAD MADE EARLIER TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
As for Garco's assertion that it had presented matters in a different light, the Utah Supreme 
Court's ruling in Bd. of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 
1983) is instructive. In that case, the trial court initially entered summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff on liability, reserving damages for trial. Id. at 1032. The plaintiff later amended its complaint 
5
 Affiant Paul Kingston had been an agent of Garco's (R. 365), and apparently has a familial 
relationship with Joseph Kingston, Garco's property manager (R.258), and Carl Kingston, Garco's 
attorney during the lease negotiations (R.253). Affiant Elaine Crossley is an officer of Garco 
(R.361). 
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and changed its recovery theory. Id. At trial, a second trial judge reversed the previous grant of 
summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
noted that the new theory that the plaintiff had asserted did not affect the basic issue of liability, and 
held that the second trial judge had erred in reversing the first grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1033. 
In the instant matter, the only issues before the trial court on reconsideration were those raised in the 
complaint and dismissed on summary judgment. Until it filed its reply memorandum in support of its 
reconsideration motion, all Garco did in its reconsideration motion was to incorporate previously raised 
theories and elaborate on them. 
With regard to Garco's trespass theory, Garco argued on reconsideration that Reagan had no 
binding written lease with Garco, and that Reagan's duties could not be defined by the lease Reagan 
had with Garco's predecessor (R.442). Garco had presented this same point to the trial court in oral 
argument in its opposition to Reagan's motion (R.525, p.8-10). Garco argued on reconsideration that 
Reagan had agreed in a letter to remove the foundation (R. 442-43). Again, Garco presented this same 
argument to the trial court at the hearing on Reagan's motion (R.525, p.l 1-12). In its reconsideration 
motion, Garco argued that the lease contained "implied terms," such as a duty to not commit waste, 
which would impose a duty on Reagan to remove the foundation (R.443-45). Garco had argued the 
same point to the trial court at the hearing (R.525, p. 14). 
With regard to the unlawful detainer claim, Garco stood steadfastly by the argument that it had 
made in its initial opposition to Reagan's motion, i.e., that the presence of the foundation on Garco's 
property means that Reagan is in continuing possession of Garco's property (R.445-46; R.210-11). The 
trial court had already considered and rejected Garco's argument (R.437). Garco's reference in its 
reconsideration motion to federal and state antitrust acts (R.446-47) was not its first mention of those 
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statutes. Garco had raised them in its initial opposition to Reagan's motion (R.214). The trial court did 
not err in refusing to set aside its prior grant of summary judgment solely because Garco had elaborated 
on the alleged application of the antitrust statutes to Garco's claims.6 
Frankly, in light of the fact that all Garco did in its reconsideration motion was to elaborate on 
arguments that it had previously made, the trial court would have abused its discretion had it chosen 
to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 551 P.2d 244 (Nev. 1976), cited in 
Bd. of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033 (second trial judge 
abused discretion in overruling first since only distinguishing feature between two motions was citation 
of additional authority). As the trial court correctly noted, Garco's arguments "essentially rehash[ed]" 
arguments that the trial court had already fully considered and rejected. (R.513). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY STRUCK THE NEW ARGUMENTS THAT 
GARCO RAISED IN ITS REPLY MEMORANDUM. 
Garco raised a series of new arguments and theories in its final Reply Memorandum filed in 
support of its Motion to Reconsider, which the trial court properly struck pursuant to the principles of 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Ut. App. 1993). As stated in that case, it is incumbent upon 
a movant to include within its principal supporting memorandum all issues on which it believes it is 
entitled to prevail. State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1003-04 (Ut. App. 1993), quoting White v. 
Kent Medical Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. App. 1991). In Phathammavong, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that a movant's argument raised for the first time in a reply memorandum was not 
properly before the trial court. 
6
 In any event, as the federal court rejected Garco's claims under the Sherman Act (Appendix 
2), Garco's state antitrust claims would be similarly rejected under U.C.A. §76-10-926. 
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Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the 
nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond. It is for this reason that, in the analogous area 
of appellate review, the rule is well settled that the court will not consider issues raised for the 
first time in a reply brief. 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1003-04. As noted in Phathammavong, Rule 202(b)(2), 
U.S.Dist.Ct., D.Utah, limits reply memoranda to rebutting matters raised in the memorandum opposing 
the motion, as does Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Phathammavong, 860 
P.2d at 1004. Additionally, as the Phathammavong court noted, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 
explains that "rebuttal evidence is restricted to 'explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in 
evidence by the opposing party/" State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004. Thus, it is error for a 
court to consider issues raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. Id. 
Substantial portions of Garco' s reply memorandum filed in support of its reconsideration motion 
consisted of new argument raised for the first time: 
1. Points "D" and "E" consisted of arguments that relied in whole on an assertion 
completely unsupported by the record that Reagan did not remove its sign from Garco's property until 
July 19, 1995, after the lease expired (R.473-74). Prior to filing the Reply Memo, Garco had admitted 
that the sign was removed in June 1995. (R.387/P0; R. 133,124 in conjunction with R. 199,^24 and 
R.203,^45). Until its Reply Memo, Garco had never asserted that the sign was still in place after June 
19th, and certainly not after July 8, 1995, the deadline referenced in Garco's own notice to Reagan to 
remove the sign (R. 185). The Phathammavong court squarely rejected a similar effort to alter key dates 
at the last moment ~ in that case, in a reply memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss, the 
defendant suggested a different key operative date than that which he had previously argued. The 
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Phathammavong court held that the trial court was correct in disregarding this new assertion. The trial 
court's similar prohibition in this case was appropriate.7 Points "D" and "E" were properly stricken. 
2. In Point "B," Garco argued that the written lease between Reagan and Garco was an 
unenforceable "adhesion contract." (R.469-71). Garco admitted in its reply brief that it had never 
before analyzed this issue (R.469). The issue was not raised or argued in Garco's principal 
memorandum filed in support of its Motion to Revise Order, and Garco offered no facts in support of 
its procedural or substantive unconscionability argument. (See Section III.C.5., infra, at pps. 44-46). 
Since Garco argued the issue for the first time in its reply, Garco's Point "B" was properly stricken 
under the principles of Phathammavong. 
3. Garco's Point "F" was an entirely new argument regarding public policy (R.475). To 
the extent it characterized Reagan's foundation as "waste," pursuant to Utah's environmental quality 
administrative procedures, it raised factual issues that were never addressed by either of the parties at 
any time. For example, Reagan never had an opportunity to demonstrate that the foundation is "fill 
material" or "inert waste," which are materials that are excluded from the purview of the environmental 
regulations that Garco cited. (See footnote 15, infra). The trial court properly struck this argument. 
4. The trial court also properly struck Point II, as that point relied on Garco's Points "B," 
"D," "E," and "F" (R.476). 
7
 Garco asserts on appeal that Points "D" and "E" points only went to Garco's argument that a 
Reagan letter had clarified a contract ambiguity (Garco's Brief, p. 37). However, a review of 
Garco's reply memorandum belies that claim. In Point "D", Garco argued that because Reagan's 
sign was still on the property after July 19th, Reagan had forfeited any contractual right to remove 
the sign (R.474). And in Point "E", Garco asserted that the trial court had "not adequately considered 
the timing of Reagan's acts, or the undisputed fact that even under Reagan's theory of the case 
Reagan had already stayed in possession beyond the time it had to vacate." Id. 
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Garco asserts that it raised these arguments to rebut "Reagan's argument that the trial court had 
already 'heard and ruled upon most if not all of the facts and legal arguments that Garco now seeks to 
have the Court reconsider.'" (Garco's Brief, p. 37). Therefore, Garco claims, the reply memorandum 
only "illustrated] arguments Garco had raised, but were not argued or ruled on," (Garco's Brief, p. 37). 
This is incorrect. As demonstrated above, the reply memorandum raised new, substantive arguments 
that had never before been raised or considered. The Reagan argument which Garco claims to have 
been rebutting did not open the door to a whole host of new issues. In rebuttal of Reagan's argument, 
Garco was limited to demonstrating, if it could, that the arguments that it had made in its principal 
memorandum were new (which they were not). 
Finally, contrary to Garco's assertion, the trial court did not rely on the stricken arguments when 
it denied Garco's motion to reconsider. In accordance with Phathammavong, it simply and properly 
disregarded them (R.513). 
ISSUE 3 - GARCO FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A TRIAL ON ANY OF 
THE CAUSES OF ACTION THAT IT HAD RAISED. 
Even if the trial court's December 29,1997 Order and Judgment were before this Court, the trial 
court committed no error in dismissing Garco's claims. Garco failed to present sufficient evidence to 
show that Reagan's movement of the sign to the neighboring property was anything other than 
legitimate competitive activity. Garco also presented no evidence to support its assertion that the means 
by which Reagan accomplished that move were improper. And Garco presented no evidence at all in 
8
 To the extent Garco asserts that the Order the trial court signed in this regard did not accurately 
reflect the trial court's minute entry (Garco's Brief, p. 36), Garco itself approved the Order as to form 
(R.520). 
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support of its Unfair Practices Act claim. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly dismissed 
Garco's claims for intentional interference and unfair practices. 
As for Garco's trespass and unlawful detainer claims, Reagan was in legal possession of the 
property at the time the foundation was placed on the property, and Reagan had no duty to remove it 
at the end of its tenancy. Common law trespass principles do not apply under these circumstances. 
Thus, whether Garco purchased the property subject to the terms of the lease between Reagan and 
Garco's predecessor is irrelevant to dismissal of Garco's trespass claim. In any event, Garco had 
sufficient notice at the time it purchased the property to take subject to the terms of the lease between 
Reagan and Garco's predecessor. Reagan vacated the property when it moved its sign to the 
neighboring property, and the trial court properly dismissed Garco's trespass and unlawful detainer 
claims. The claim for punitive damages was properly dismissed when all substantive causes of action 
were dismissed. 
A. THE FACTS THAT GARCO PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS WERE 
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
REAGAN HAD COMMITTED THE TORT. 
In order to recover under its theory of intentional interference with economic relations, Garco 
had the burden of convincing the trial court that (a) Reagan had intentionally interfered with Garco's 
potential economic relations, (b) that Reagan's alleged interference was carried out for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, and (c) that Reagan's act was the cause of Garco's alleged injury. 
Leigh Furniture v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). 
On summary judgment, the trial court was required to view the evidence that Garco presented 
in support of this claim through the prism of Garco's substantive evidentiary burden. Anderson v. 
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986).9 After review of all of the evidence 
that Garco had presented, the trial court ruled that Garco had failed to present sufficient evidence of an 
improper purpose or improper means (R.438-39). Thus, Garco failed to prove element (b) of the tort.10 
1. The Evidence That Garco Presented In Support of its "Improper Purpose" 
Claim Was Sufficient Only to Demonstrate that Reagan's Move of the Sign 
Was Legitimate Competitive Activity. 
The trial court first rejected Garco's claim of intentional interference with economic relations 
on the basis of the improper purpose prong of the Leigh case, stating: 
[E]ven if the Court implies as true that [Reagan's] purpose in locating the sign as it did on the 
neighboring property was to prevent [Garco] from erecting its own sign, there is no evidence 
that any injury to [Garco] occasioned by [Reagan's] move of the sign to the neighboring 
property was an end in and of itself, designed to harm [Garco] merely for the sake of injury 
alone. Instead, [Reagan's] move of the sign to its present location constituted legitimate 
competitive activity, consistent with an effort by [Reagan] to achieve the long-range economic 
goal of maximizing its profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling 
competitive activity on [Garco's] property. Thus, there is no evidence of improper purpose. 
(R.438). 
9
 One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of 
factually unsupported claims and defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). 
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving 
party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for 
the rights of persons asserting claims, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims to 
demonstrate in the manner provided by Rule 56, prior to trial, that the claims have no factual basis. 
Celotex Corp., supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2555. Garco had the burden of coming forward with facts, under 
oath, as required by Rule 56(e), U.R.Civ.P., to establish its claim. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, 
Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1988); Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 
(Utah 1988). 
10
 Reagan never admitted to element (a) of the tort, but rather presented evidence that Reagan's 
placement of the Mollerup sign was dictated by the owner of the adjacent property (R. 187-89). 
Reagan further denied that it had told Garco that it would move the sign in order to prevent Garco 
from doing business with anyone but Reagan (R.430,lf3; R.385,^20). The evidence being in dispute, 
Reagan did not seek summary judgment on that element. 
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In finding a lack of evidence to show improper purpose, the trial court relied on Leigh's 
explanation of the improper purpose prong. In Leigh, the Utah Supreme Court had first noted that there 
was substantial evidence Leigh Corporation had deliberately injured Isom's economic relations. But 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled, as a matter of law, that Leigh Corporation's actions had not been taken 
for an improper purpose: 
. . . [T]hat injury was not an end in itself. It was an intermediate step toward achieving the long-
range financial goal of profitably reselling the building free of Isom's interest. Because that 
economic interest seems to have been controlling, we must conclude that the evidence in this 
case would not support a jury finding that the Corporation's predominant purpose was to 
injure or ruin Isom 's business merely for the sake of injury alone. 
Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d at 308 (emphasis added). Thus, the Leigh Court found that in acting 
to further a legitimate and controlling long-range financial goal, one does not violate the improper 
purpose element of the tort -- even if one of the actor's purposes is to harm another's business. Id. 
The improper purpose prong of Leigh has been reviewed by Utah appellate courts only twice 
since the case was decided. In Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of Pratt on the improper purpose prong, noting that Prodata, Inc. 
had evidenced "consistent and open hostility" toward Pratt, Id. at 789, that Prodata, Inc. had taken 
advantage of "personal leverage that it apparently had with UDOT [Pratt's employer] by inducing 
UDOT to fire Pratt," Id. at 791, and that Prodata, Inc. had utilized a non-compete covenant (that had 
expired) "to threaten substantial liability and to demand a substantial payment from Pratt when it knew 
it had not suffered any actual damages from Pratt's breach [of the covenant]." Id. at 789. The Pratt 
Court noted that Prodata, Inc. had taken these actions even though the non-compete covenant had 
already expired and could no longer be used to prevent Pratt from working at UDOT. Id. On these 
facts, the Pratt Court found that the jury "could have found something akin to extortion in [Prodata, 
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Inc.'s] motivation." Id. A review of the facts in Pratt reveals no economic justification at all for 
Prodata, Inc.'s actions -- Prodata, Inc. had suffered no harm as a result of Pratt's breach of the non-
compete covenant. Id. at 789. Prodata, Inc. was simply acting gratuitously by contacting UDOT to 
harm Pratt. Id at 791. 
Similarly, in Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1997), during 
the ongoing course of a dispute between Promax and Mattson over the construction costs for building 
a home, Mattson listed the home for sale and procured a buyer. Id. at 250-51. When advised of the 
sale, Promax insisted that it was entitled to a real estate commission, and threatened to "kill the deal" 
if Mattson did not acquiesce. Id. at 251. When Mattson refused, Promax encouraged several material 
suppliers to file mechanics liens on the home, and the buyer backed out of the deal as a result. Id. The 
Promax Court noted that Promax had not looked to enforce any contract regarding commissions that 
it felt might have existed between itself and Mattson, but had instead "used its leverage and connections 
with the material suppliers to harm Mattson." Id. at 255. The lack of economic justification for 
Promax's actions in Promax is even more glaring than in Pratt. In Promax, by killing the deal, the only 
result was harm to Mattson - while Mattson would lose the sale as a result of Promax's interference, 
the interference did not result in Promax procuring any commission. 
As noted in Leigh, when the actor is primarily motivated by advancing his own economic 
interests, there is no tort: 
Because it requires that the improper purpose predominate, this alternative takes the long 
view of the defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be eclipsed by 
legitimate long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, much competitive commercial activity, 
such as a businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range 
economic interests, could become tortious. In the rough and tumble of the marketplace, 
competitors inevitably damage one another in the struggle for personal advantage. The law 
offers no remedy for those damages - even if intentional - because they are an inevitable by-
product of competition. 
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Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d at 307'. 
The decision in which Leigh had its genesis was Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
582 P.2d 1365,1372 (Or. 1978). In that case, the Oregon Supreme Court could not, as a matter of law, 
find any improper purpose in Allstate's discouraging its claimants from taking their automobiles to Top 
Service's shop. After a dispute between Allstate and Top Service, Allstate adjusters actively 
discouraged its claimants from taking work to Top Service. Id. Allstate began disparaging the quality 
of Top Service's work, and on at least one occasion, opted to total a car rather than have it repaired at 
Top Service. Id. Allstate also began actively directing its insurance claimants to Top Service's 
competitors. Id. But as the Oregon Supreme Court noted in affirming the trial court's judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, %\ . . these acts were wholly consistent with Allstate's pursuit of its own 
business purposes as it saw them and did not suffice to support an inference of the alleged improper 
purpose to injure Top Service." Id. Similarly, in BirkenwaldDistributing Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 776 
P.2d 721 (Wash.App. 1989), the appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of liquor distributor's 
claim of intentional interference against its supplier. The supplier had refused to approve the 
distributor's proposed transferee, instead choosing a different transferee, and had thus forced the 
distributor to sell its business at a discount. Id. at 727. Noting that the supplier had every right to select 
the replacement distributor of its choice, the court found: 
Asserting one's rights to maximize economic interests does not create an inference of ill will 
or improper purpose. . . . The purpose was not improper because there was no evidence that 
[the supplier] asserted its right for any reason other than to select a replacement distributor of 
its own choice. Because [the distributor] lost nothing to which it was entitled, and because it 
failed to raise an inference of improper purpose, dismissal was proper. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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In the case at bar, Garco introduced the following evidence in support of its allegation that 
Reagan's purpose in placing the sign as it did was to harm Garco: 
(a) That Reagan indicated that if Garco did not enter into a lease with Reagan on 
Reagan's terms, Reagan would remove its sign and erect another within 500 feet of Garco's 
southern boundary, so that Garco could not do business with anyone but Reagan (Garco's Brief, 
p. 29). 
(b) That Reagan did, in fact, remove its sign from Garco's property and erect another 
within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary, although it could have chosen a different location 
that would have allowed Garco to do business with one of Reagan's competitors (Garco's Brief, 
p.30).11 
(c) That after Reagan removed its Garco sign, it told Garco that it would still like 
to explore the possibility of locating an outdoor advertising sign on Garco's property (Garco's 
Brief, pps. 30-31).12 
11
 Reagan admitted these facts only for purposes of summary judgment (R.130). But Reagan 
denied that it had told Garco that it intended to prevent Garco from doing business with anyone but 
Reagan, (R.430,P; R.385,^f20), and submitted testimony from James Mollerup, the owner of the 
adjacent property, that it was Mr. Mollerup, and not Reagan, who had dictated the placement of 
Reagan's sign on the Mollerup property (R. 187-89). Nevertheless, for purposes of the summary 
judgment motion, Reagan and the trial court both assumed that Garco's allegations in this regard 
were true (R.130; R.438). 
12
 Garco offers additional "evidence" on appeal in support of its argument that Reagan's purpose 
was improper, asserting that in maximizing its profits, Reagan could have contracted with Garco's 
neighbor to the south for a sign, and that other sign companies can still compete for a lease on that 
property. (Garco's Brief, p. 32). Garco's assertion is sheer speculation that ignores the myriad of 
factors that would go into a decision by Reagan, Reagan's competitors, and/or Garco's southern 
neighbor regarding the placement of a sign on the southern property. And frankly, the potential 
availability of the southern property for a sign site is evidence of Reagan's economic concerns rather 
than its alleged intent to harm Garco. The southern property would have been completely 
unavailable to Reagan had the Mollerup sign been placed so that Garco could contract with a 
(continued...) 
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As the trial court properly found, none of this evidence supports an inference of anything other than 
"legitimate competitive activity, consistent with an effort by [Reagan] to achieve the long-range 
economic goal of maximizing its profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling 
competitive activity on [Garco's] property." (R. 438). Contrary to Garco's assertions, it can only be 
inferred from the evidence that Garco presented, and in particular from Reagan's continued efforts to 
work with Garco to negotiate a lease, that Reagan did not intend to harm Garco, but instead wanted the 
opportunity to earn as much advertising revenue as it could generate from signs in the area. Of the 
three scenarios which might have occurred at the time Reagan moved its sign from Garco's property 
to the Mollerup property, the most valuable to Reagan would obviously be having two signs in the area, 
one on Mollerup's northern property boundary and one on Garco's southern property boundary, with 
income streams from both. Reagan's continued negotiations with Garco after it moved the sign to the 
Mollerup property are evidence of Reagan's desire and intent to implement this most valuable scenario. 
The second most valuable scenario to Reagan would be to have the only sign in the area — economic 
principles of supply and demand would operate to allow Reagan to maximize its profits from the sign. 
The least valuable scenario to Reagan is the one that Garco proposes Reagan had a duty to provide -
a Reagan sign on the Mollerup property and a competitor's sign on the Garco property. Pursuant to that 
(...continued) 
competitor. Absent Garco's speculation, the record evidence supports the availability of only two 
sign sites in the vicinity, i.e., one on the Mollerup property and one on Garco's property. As for 
Garco's assertion that Reagan evidenced an improper purpose by leaving the sign foundation in 
place, there is not even a hint of evidence to indicate that the presence of the sign foundation 
prevented Garco from contracting with Reagan's competitors or that the presence of the foundation 
has harmed Garco in any way. Instead, the record reflects that Garco continues to utilize the 
foundation for parking. (R. 168). 
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scenario, supply and demand no longer maximizes Reagan's profits, and the income stream from the 
Garco sign would go to Reagan's competitors. Leigh does not dictate such a result. 
As Justices Stewart and Durham noted in Pratt, the improper purpose prong of Leigh must be 
applied narrowly in the context of commercial dealings: 
[I]f construed broadly, [the improper purpose prong] could seriously interfere with the forces 
of competition in the marketplace when competitors seek to take business away from others by 
lowering prices or by blaming other means that harm a competitor. Certainly, such commercial 
conduct cases " do not fall within the scope of an improper-purpose test when the conduct is 
legitimate competitive conduct, such as is recognized under the antitrust laws. 
Pratt v. Prodata, 885 P.2d at 790 (J.Stewart, J.Durham concurring) (emphasis added). Justice 
Zimmerman, who wrote the main opinion in Pratt, expressed "grave doubts about the future vitality 
of Leigh's improper purpose prong, especially in the context of commercial dealings," and warned that 
Leigh has potential for misuse. Id. at 798, fn.3. 
Garco's complaint against Reagan is a prime example of misuse of the tort. Unlike the actors 
in Pratt and Prodata, Reagan did not actively contact a third party to interfere with Garco's prospective 
or actual economic relations. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Garco, the facts evidence 
that Reagan only placed the Mollerup sign in such a way that the 500 foot restrictions of the Outdoor 
Advertising Act would prevent Garco from contracting with Reagan's competitors. Reagan used the 
Mollerup property in a legal manner for outdoor advertising. Reagan's alleged conduct is no different 
from, for example, tavern owners who compete to hold liquor licenses in a strip mall. Assuming that 
regulatory spacing requirements would allow one licensee at each end of the mall, the smart tavern 
owner would lease space in the center of the mall, thus precluding any of his competitors from leasing 
space in the mall. This is not improper conduct, but a "struggle for personal advantage" in the "rough 
and tumble of the marketplace." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307. 
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Garco asserts that this is anti-competitive conduct prohibited by the state's antitrust statutes. 
To the contrary, Chief Judge David Sam of the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
summarily dismissed Garco's federal antitrust claims against Reagan in August 1998 (Appendix 2). 
Because Utah's antitrust statute would be interpreted in a comparable manner pursuant to U.C.A. §76-
10-926, Judge Sam's unappealed decision conclusively establishes that Reagan's (alleged) conduct is 
legitimate competitive conduct recognized and permitted under the antitrust laws. Competitive conduct 
that is permitted under the antitrust laws cannot be punished as tortious interference. Pratt v. Prodata, 
885 P.2d at 790 (J.Stewart, J.Durham concurring); Willamette Dental Group v. Oregon Dental Service 
Corp., 882 P.2d 637, 644 (Or.App. 1994). 
Reagan had a right, when it could not contract with Garco on favorable terms, to move its sign 
to the neighboring property, where the landowner was, in fact, willing to lease its property on 
acceptable terms. Assuming that Reagan did, in fact, choose the placement of the sign on the Mollerup 
property, Reagan had a right, in furtherance of "maximiz[ing its] economic interests," Birkenwald, 776 
P.2d at 727, to take advantage of the 500 foot requirements and place the Mollerup sign so as to prevent 
a competitor from erecting an outdoor advertising sign on the Garco property. "[A] businessman's 
efforts to forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range economic interests" is not an 
improper purpose. Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308. The trial court's ruling that there was no evidence 
of improper purpose was supported by the record and was entirely correct. 
2. Garco Failed to Present Any Evidence to Support Its Assertion That The 
Means by Which Reagan Prevented a Competing Sign from Being Erected 
on the Garco Property Were Improper. 
Garco offers three arguments in support of its contention that Reagan acted by improper means 
in preventing Garco from competing. None of those arguments is valid. 
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First, Garco asserts that Reagan violated UDOT regulations in the process of erecting and 
obtaining permits for its Mollerup sign (Garco's Brief, p. 33). Garco offered no evidence to the trial 
court to support that argument, but only speculation and uncertified copies of UDOT records that Garco 
had attached to a memorandum (R.345-48). The only evidence before the trial court on this point was 
from the UDOT official who had supervised Reagan's permitting process, who attested that Reagan 
had, in fact, complied in all respects with UDOT's rules and regulations in moving its sign to the 
Mollerup property. (R.406-17). Moreover, as the trial court ruled, there was no evidence that the 
alleged violation of UDOT's regulations was the cause of Garco's inability to procure its own permit: 
The Court notes that it is undisputed that after lengthy lease negotiations between [Garco and 
Reagan], on February 23, 1995, [Garco] advised [Reagan] that it had "elected to pursue other 
options" and demanded that [Reagan] immediately remove the sign. [Reagan] contracted with 
the neighboring property owner on April 20, 1995, and applied to UDOT to move the sign 
shortly thereafter. There is no evidence that [Garco] took any substantial steps during that 
interim period to attempt to secure its own permit for a competing sign. Nor is there any 
evidence before the Court that [Reagan's] R-407 permit was improperly granted or that 
[Reagan's] two signs being erected at the same time for some three weeks caused any injury to 
[Garco]. Therefore, there is no evidence that [Reagan] acted by improper means in moving its 
sign to the neighboring property or that [Reagan's] act in moving the sign was the cause of 
[Garco's] inability to procure its own permit. 
(R.438). In its Brief, Garco does not explain how this ruling is erroneous (Garco's Brief, p. 33). Garco 
really only asserts that on the basis of some confusion about the process by which Reagan obtained its 
permit for the Mollerup sign — confusion that UDOT's own permits officer explained and corrected 
(R.406-17) -- Reagan is guilty of tortious interference with Garco's economic relations. The trial court 
was entirely correct in ruling that the permitting process did not evidence improper means. 
Second, Garco asserts that improper means are evidenced in Reagan's alleged trespass on 
Garco's property. Garco's argument on this point is confusing. If Garco is relying on Reagan's 
conduct in allegedly "lull[ing] Garco into inaction" (Garco's Brief, p. 34), Garco does not explain how 
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this alleged conduct affected its ability to contract with a Reagan competitor. Moreover, as noted in 
the trial court's December Order, "[Garco] abandoned its argument that the lease negotiations. . . 
constituted improper means." (R.438). At oral argument, Garco's counsel had stated that, "Garco never 
claimed that so-called lulling constitutes an improper means." (R.525, p.34). Thus, the lease 
negotiations between Garco and Reagan cannot constitute alleged improper means for purposes of 
Garco's appeal. If, instead, Garco is relying on Reagan's continued possession of the property after 
Garco purchased the property. Garco admitted that that possession was by oral agreement or as a tenant 
at will (R.198,^13). Garco's notice to remove the sign, which was given in February 1995, told Reagan 
to remove the sign by July 8, 1995 (R.185). Thus, Reagan's possession during this time period could 
not be a trespass. If Garco is instead relying on the continuing presence of the sign foundation after 
June 1995, there is no hint of evidence in the record that the foundation had any effect at all on Garco's 
ability to contract with any of Reagan's competitors. 
Finally, Garco asserts that Reagan's act constituted conduct forbidden by the Utah Antitrust Act. 
As set forth above, Garco's identical claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act was summarily dismissed 
by the federal court pursuant to the state action doctrine (Appendix 2). In construing whether Reagan's 
conduct violated the Utah Antitrust Act, this Court must "be guided by interpretations given by the 
federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes...." U.C.A. §76-10-926. Judge Sam's finding 
that Reagan's alleged anti-competitive conduct was immune from federal antitrust laws conclusively 
establishes that Reagan's alleged conduct is does not violate the state antitrust statute. Competitive 
conduct that is permitted under the antitrust laws cannot be punished as tortious interference. 
Willamette Dental Group v. Oregon Dental Service Corp., 882 P.2d 637,644 (Or.App. 1994). The trial 
court did not err in finding that Garco failed to present evidence of improper means. 
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B. GARCO OFFERED NOT A SHRED OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM 
UNDER THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT 
Garco never offered any evidence at all to show that Reagan violated the Unfair Practices Act. 
The purpose of the Act is to foster and encourage competition. U.C.A. §13-5-7. What the Act prohibits 
is price discrimination, §13-5-3, and sales at less than cost, §13-5-7. Garco never even alleged, much 
less offered evidence, that Reagan had engaged in price discrimination or sold anything at less than cost. 
The trial court correctly dismissed this claim. 
C. THE LEASE PURSUANT TO WHICH REAGAN INSTALLED THE SIGN ON 
THE PROPERTY DID NOT OBLIGATE REAGAN TO REMOVE THE 
FOUNDATION. 
The trial court also correctly ruled that Reagan had not trespassed on Garco's property and that 
Reagan was not liable to Garco for unlawful detainer by failing to remove the foundation from Garco's 
real property. It was undisputed below that in 1975, Reagan leased the property from Garco's 
predecessors-in-interest for the purpose of erecting and maintaining an outdoor advertising sign on the 
subject property. (R.l). It was also undisputed that Reagan placed the outdoor advertising sign, 
including its foundation, on the property pursuant to its rights under the lease (R.l91-93; Garco's Brief, 
p. 6, T|l). The purpose of the lease was to allow Reagan to erect an outdoor sign in order to utilize the 
property for outdoor advertising (R.l93). The lease gave Reagan the right to move or change the sign 
at any time (R.l93). But the lease did not obligate Reagan to remove the sign or the foundation at the 
end of the lease term or to restore the premises to their pre-lease condition. In the absence of such 
duties, the actions of which Garco has complained are not trespass, nor do they constitute the basis for 
an unlawful detainer claim, as the trial court correctly ruled. 
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1. There is No Cause of Action for Trespass When the Actor is in Legal 
Possession of the Property at the Time the Alleged Harm is Introduced. 
As Garco has noted in its Brief, the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that one is subject 
to liability for trespass if he "fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §158 (emphasis added). It follows that in the absence of such a duty, 
one cannot be held liable for trespass. 
In determining whether a tenant has a duty at the end of a lease to remove structures that the 
tenant has erected during the term of the lease, courts look to the purposes of the lease and to its terms. 
For instance, in Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 227 P.2d 88 (Kan. 1951), the defendant leased real 
property from the plaintiff to utilize as a site to construct tanks, power stations, pipelines and other 
structures for use in the tenant's operation of a tank and pump station. Id. at 89. In furtherance of those 
purposes, the tenant had built, maintained, and utilized certain buildings and improvements on the 
property for a number of years before the lease terminated. Id. at 90. On termination of the lease, the 
tenant failed to remove: 
. . . several hundred feet of concrete sidewalks, concrete foundations for five or six dwelling 
houses, concrete foundations for four or five garages, concrete foundations for pumps and 
powers; and failed to take up and remove several hundred feet of pipe lines; failed to tear down 
and level the banks of earth tanks; failed to remove large quantities of broken concrete, stones, 
bricks, iron pipes and other similar refuse; failed to remove and destroy noxious weeds, grasses, 
trees, vines, and shrubs; failed to remove oil that had been permitted to flow or be spilled on the 
soil; failed to fill ditches, sumps, ponds, and other holes and depressions on said leased land, 
and failed to remove gravel and chat placed thereon for use in roadways and drives. 
Id. at 90. The lessor sued to recover damages resulting from the tenant's failure to remove these items 
it had placed on the property during its tenancy and to restore the premises to their pre-lease condition. 
The appellate court reviewed the lease between the parties, and then, relying on case law from 
Oklahoma, Texas and Kansas, upheld the trial court's demurrer of the complaint: 
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Considering the expressed purpose of the lease, plaintiff was bound to know that the 
lessee, in furtherance thereof, would erect buildings, tanks, pipelines and all other things 
necessary for the operation of the business at hand. In fact, the right to erect such improvements 
was granted, but nowhere in the contract is there any provision requiring lessee, upon 
termination of the lease, to restore the premises to their former condition. As we read this lease 
contract, defendant lessee was under no duty at any time to remove any of its property. It was 
given the right and option to do so if it so desired, but nowhere is plaintiff lessor given the right 
to enforce removal. 7/ therefore follows that since plaintiff had no right to enforce removal he 
is in no position to complain of the partial removal, which was done under contract right of 
lessee so to do, in the absence of negligence in accomplishing such partial removal. Had the 
parties desired to contract that upon termination of the lease defendant would be required to 
remove all of its property and to restore the premises to their former condition, they could have 
done so, but here the only covenant touching removal of the property is the one giving lessee 
the right to remove if it so desires. 
Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Sherman Co. v. United States of America, 258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958), the United 
States government had leased the plaintiffs land as a military post, and constructed a number of 
buildings and other structures having concrete foundations. The lease stated that the structures would 
remain the property of the United States, "and may be removed therefrom by the Government prior to 
the termination of this lease." Id. at 882 (J.Hamley, concurring). When the lease expired, the buildings 
were removed, but the government left the foundations in place. Rejecting the landowner's claim for 
damages, the Ninth Circuit noted that: 
The lease in question gave the Government the right to remove improvements at the 
expiration of the lease, but not the duty to do so. There is no express covenant requiring the 
Government to restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the beginning of 
the term. Under these circumstances, there is no implied covenant of the kind suggested by [the 
landowner]. 
Id. (J.Hamley, concurring).13 
13
 Garco attempted below to distinguish Duvanel and Sherman by asserting that the lessees in 
those cases did not retain ownership of the improvements (R.209-10). In fact, both of the lessees 
in those cases did retain ownership of the improvements. Sherman Co. v. United States of America, 
258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958) (paragraph 8 of the lease stated, "...fixtures, additions, or structures so 
(continued...) 
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See, also, Fox v. Cities Service Oil Co., 200 P.2d 398 (Ok. 1948) (no implied covenant to remove 
foundations or concrete slabs necessary to lessee's placing and operation of its building); Amoco 
Production Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 896-97 (N.M. 1985) (New Mexico Supreme Court 
reversed appellate court's imposition of implied contractual duty to restore the surface estate following 
cessation of drilling operations). 
(...continued) 
placed upon or attached to the premises shall be and remain the property of the Government and may 
be removed therefrom by the Government..."); Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 227 P.2d 88, 89 
(Kan. 1951) (lessee entitled to remove all improvements at any time). 
Garco also attempted below to distinguish Sherman by arguing that the lessor had expressly 
relieved the lessee of restoration responsibility. (R.472). But the Sherman court specifically noted 
that "the Government would be free of liability even in the absence of a covenant expressly relieving 
it of responsibility for restoring the premises." Sherman v. U.S., 258 F.2d at 882-83. 
Garco also argued to the trial court that Duvenal was questionable authority, asserting that the 
court in Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1986) had noted a trend 
to reverse older cases not recognizing a duty to restore. (R.210). Garco failed to recognize, however, 
that the court in that case was deeply divided on that issue. The dissenting opinion, recognizing that 
other jurisdictions had enacted legislation to create the duty, noted that: 
Other jurisdictions having no legislation covering the matter hold that there is no 
implied duty upon the mineral lessee to restore the surface. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. 
Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Texas 1957); Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farms, 703 P.2d 
894 (N.M. 1985). 
I find no evidence whatever of the "changes in the viewpoint of courts." While I find 
some evidence of the legislative trend, I find the judicial one exists only in the hopes and 
dreams of the authors cited in the majority opinion. In my view we have no business making 
a blatant change in the law of mineral leases. Rather, I agree with the conclusion of the 
author of one article cited by the majority: "The best solution to this problem seems to be the 
adoption of a statute, similar to the Kansas and Illinois statutes, requiring restoration of the 
premises upon completion of operations." L. Davis, Selected Problems Regarding Lessee's 
Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst, at 349 (1963). 
Bonds v. Sanchez-0 'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d at 447. Even Garco recognized below that 
a remedial statute was required in Kansas to overrule Duvenal and to place a duty on the lessee to 
remove the improvements at the end of the lease (R.210). 
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While Utah has not addressed the specific issue, courts around the nation have rejected efforts 
to establish a trespass action under circumstances in which real property is even more permanently 
changed by the actions of a prior party who had been lawfully in possession of the property at the time 
the change was wrought. A large body of law has developed over who has the ultimate responsibility 
to clean up hazardous wastes left on real property, an issue that has far greater impact on property than 
the inert foundation that remained on Garco's property at the termination of Reagan's lease. The courts 
have held that while the original actor may be liable under federal and/or state statutes for the cleanup, 
there can be no cause of action stated for common-law trespass, as the actor was legally entitled to be 
in possession of the property when the action was taken. For example, in Wellesley Hills Realty Trust 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F.Supp. 93 (D.Mass. 1990), Mobil Oil owned the real property and operated 
a gas station on it for many years. During this period, hazardous materials were released on the 
property. Mobil eventually sold the property without removing the hazardous materials, and a 
subsequent owner sued Mobil under various theories for damaging the property. Id. at 94. While the 
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs claims based on remedial state statutes, Id. at 98, it did summarily 
dismiss the plaintiff s claims for trespass: 
Count III of the complaint asserts that Mobil's releases of oil and hazardous materials at the site 
constitute a trespass. A trespass, however, requires an unprivileged, intentional intrusion on 
land in the possession of another. New England Box Co. V. C & R Const. Co., 313 Mass. 696, 
707, 49 N.E.2d 121 (1943); Restatement (Second) Torts §158. In this case, Mobil owned and 
was in possession of the property when it allegedly released the oil causing the contamination. 
Thus, Mobil's releases of oil were not unprivileged, and Mobil clearly was not intruding on land 
in the possession of another. Mobil's releases of oil on its own land, therefore, cannot constitute 
a trespass. 
Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp,, 141 F.Supp. at 99. A similar analysis, relying on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, was utilized in Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 355 Ms. 58; 652 A.2d 180 
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(1994) to reject the trespass claims of a subsequent occupier of commercial property against a former 
lessee who had caused the property to become contaminated by toxic chemicals: 
Rosenblatt [plaintiff] relies upon §161 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) to 
support his position that Exxon [defendant] committed a trespass when it allegedly caused the 
property to be contaminated during its occupancy and the contamination continued into 
Rosenblatt's occupancy of the land. Section 161 provides that: "A trespass may be committed 
by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has 
tortiously placed there." 
Section 161 does not support Rosenblatt's position. It explicitly provides that a trespass 
involves the tortious placing of something on the land and implicitly provides that the affected 
land is the land of another. Section 158 further supports this interpretation. It states that "one 
is subject to liability to another for trespass... if he intentionally enters land in the possession 
of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or remains on the land, or fails to 
remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove." Exxon did not cause the 
contamination to occur during Rosenblatt's occupancy; the introduction of the contamination 
could only have occurred prior to its relinquishing possession of the land. Additionally, Exxon 
owed Rosenblatt no duty to remove the contamination. 
Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d at 78-79. Thus, if the actor who causes the contamination is lawfully 
in possession of the real property at the time the harm is introduced, there is no cause of action for 
trespass. See, also, e.g., Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., 893 F.Supp. 730 (N.D.Ohio 1995) 
(applying Ohio law).14 
14
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 167, comment b, indicates that unless a license to utilize 
property has been granted on the condition that the licensee pay for any damage that might be done 
to the property in exercise of the license, a consent to enter land for a particular purpose carries with 
it a consent to harm done to the land incidental to the actor's reasonable exercise of the license). By 
granting Reagan the right to erect the sign, including the foundation, as well as the right to remove 
or change the sign structure at any time, and by not including any obligation to restore the property 
to its pre-lease condition, Garco's predecessor consented to the continuing presence of the sign or 
any of its parts. By their own terms, neither §160 nor §170 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
on which Garco has relied, comes into play if the property owner has consented to the contested 
activity. Nor does the Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.2 support Garco's position. While that 
section requires restoration to a pre-lease condition under certain circumstances, Garco never 
demonstrated what the pre-lease condition of the property was — assuming that the area had been 
used for parking before the foundation was installed, it is still being used for parking. (R. 133,^25; 
(continued...) 
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In the instant case, the record is clear that Reagan leased Garco's land in 1975 for the expressed 
purpose of erecting and maintaining an outdoor advertising sign (R.193; lease, paragraph 1). Reagan 
was lawfully in possession of the real property at the time the sign was placed on the property. Reagan 
had the right in the lease to construct the sign, including its foundation as a necessary structure for 
erection of the sign. Id. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the lease, Reagan had the right to remove the sign 
at any time at its option (R.193). That same paragraph also gave Reagan the right to change the sign 
at any time at its option. Id. But nowhere in the lease did Reagan undertake the duty to remove the sign 
at the end of the lease, in whole or in part, nor is there reserved any right to Garco (or its predecessor) 
to insist that the land be restored to its pre-lease condition at the end of the lease. Pursuant to the terms 
of the lease, the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Garco had no right to insist that Reagan 
remove the foundation. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Garco's trespass claim. 
2. Garco Cannot Impose a Duty by Implication that Reagan Did Not 
Undertake. 
In an effort to meet the duty requirement of the trespass doctrine, Garco argues that the lease 
contained implied duties, including one to refrain from committing waste (Garco's Brief, pps. 23-24), 
as well as one for good faith and fair dealing (Garco's Brief, pps. 27-28). But in the absence of an 
express covenant requiring a tenant to remove the improvements at the end of the lease, the law will 
simply not imply one. Sherman, 258 F.2d at 881; Duvanel, 227 P.2d at 89. This would include any 
implied duty to remove the structures, regardless of how such duty is characterized: 
(...continued) 
Appendix 1 hereto). Garco also never presented any evidence that the probable future uses of the 
Garco property would be impaired by the presence of the foundation. Under such circumstances, 
§12.2 does not even apply. Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.2, Comment o. 
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The nub of [the landlord]'s contention is that, under paragraph 8 [of the lease], the 
[tenant] was authorized to remove all of a particular fixture, addition, or structure, including the 
concrete foundations thereof, but that it could not remove a part of any such fixture, addition, 
or structure, leaving portions which were unusable and expensive to remove. [The landlord] 
poses the question: "if the [tenant] had removed the roof from each of the buildings, wouldn't 
the Court be justified in saying that it must pay for the removal of the remaining part?" 
Acknowledging that there was no express covenant to complete the removal of any structures, 
[the landlord] argues that such a covenant is to be implied. 
The lease in question gave the [tenant] the right to remove improvements at the 
expiration of the lease, but not the duty to do so. There is no express covenant requiring the 
[tenant] to restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the beginning of the 
term. Under these circumstances, there is no implied covenant of the kind suggested by 
appellant. The [tenant] is not liable for damage occasioned by reason of partial removal of 
improvements, unless there was negligence in accomplishing such removal. 
Sherman Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d at 881 (C.J. Hamley concurring). 
The Sherman tenant had the right, during the existence of the lease, to add improvements, make 
alterations and so forth, which would remain the property of the tenant and could be removed at any 
time prior to expiration of the lease. Id. Reagan had the same right under the terms of the lease to erect 
the sign and then, as the owner thereof, to change or remove the sign at any time. 
By arguing that Reagan breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to 
restore the property to its pre-lease condition, Garco seeks to impose additional contractual duties on 
Reagan — duties that Reagan did not undertake pursuant to the lease. The law prohibits such use of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 358 U.A.R. 17, 19 (Utah 
1998)(implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be interpreted to make a better contract 
than the parties themselves made, nor can it be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties 
to which the parties did not agree). 
Additionally, having been authorized by the lease to change or remove the sign, Reagan did not 
commit waste by cutting it down. See, e.g., Turman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 317 P.2d 302 (Mont. 1957) 
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(no waste committed where lease authorizes tenant's act). Thus, regardless of how Garco wishes to 
characterize the duty it wishes Reagan had undertaken. Reagan had no such duty under the terms of the 
lease. The trial court properly ruled on this issue, and nothing that Garco raised either below or at the 
appellate level changes Reagan's duties.15 
3. Whether Garco Purchased the Property Subject to the Terms of the Lease 
is Irrelevant to the Dismissal of Garco's Trespass Claim. 
Garco admits that it knew before it purchased the property that Reagan had a sign on the 
property and was paying rent (R.366). Nevertheless, Garco argues that its purchase of the property was 
not subject to Reagan's lease, and that the trial court therefore erred in relying on the terms of the lease 
as a basis for dismissing Garco's trespass and unlawful detainer claims (Garco's Brief, p. 19). 
However, the trial court did not need to reach this issue in order to dismiss the trespass claim. As set 
In raising public policy concerns over environmental quality (Garco's Brief, pps. 24-25) Garco 
appears to be arguing that Reagan breached another duty that should subject Reagan to Garco's 
trespass claim. Garco did not raise this issue below until it filed its Reply Memo in Support of its 
Motion to Reconsider, and introduced no evidence to support its argument. (R.475). There was no 
evidence that by leaving the foundation in place, Reagan met the statutory definition of "disposal," 
which requires the "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of solid or 
hazardous waste . . . so that the waste . . . may enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or 
discharged into any waters. . ." U.C.A. §19-6-102(6). It also appears that the statutory/ 
administrative scheme applicable to solid waste would specifically exclude the foundation. 
U. Admin.Code R315-301 -4 circumscribes the disposal of solid waste, and specifically excludes from 
its requirements "inert waste used as fill material. . . if the disposition or disposal does not cause 
a public nuisance or hazard or contribute to land, air or water pollution." (emphasis added). See, 
also, U.C.A. § 19-6-102( 17)(b)(i) defining "solid waste" as excluding "inert construction debris used 
as fill material." "Inert waste" is defined in R315-301-2(36) as "noncombustible, nonhazardous 
solid wastes that retain its [sic] physical and chemical structure under expected conditions of 
disposal, including resistance to biological or chemical attack." The record below evidences that 
Reagan left the foundation in place at least in part because of Garco's concerns that its removal 
would undermine the foundation of an immediately adjacent building. (R.191). There was no 
evidence that the foundation would constitute a public nuisance or hazard or that it would contribute 
to land, air or water pollution. Instead, as an inert substance left in place to prevent damage to an 
adjacent structure, the foundation would likely be excluded under U.Admin.Code R315-301-4 from 
the statutory scheme governing the disposal of solid waste. In any event, since Garco failed to timely 
raise this issue, Reagan had no opportunity to introduce any evidence to rebut Garco's argument. 
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forth above, in the absence of a duty to remove the foundation, Reagan did not commit trespass by 
leaving in place the foundation which it had initially lawfully placed on the property pursuant to its 
valid lease with Garco's predecessors. Thus, whether the lease was binding on Garco is irrelevant to 
Garco's trespass claim. 
4. Garco Had Sufficient Notice of the Lease at the Time of Its Purchase of the 
Property to Take Subject to its Terms. 
Even if it were necessary to determine that the lease was binding on Garco in order to dismiss 
the trespass claim, Garco cannot avoid its obligations under that lease simply because the document was 
not recorded at the time of Garco's purchase. It was undisputed below that Reagan's sign was erected 
on the property and was in place at the time Garco obtained its own interests (R.366) Garco also admits 
that it knew that the sign was on the property at the time it purchased the property. Id. The law in the 
State of Utah for more than 100 years is that possession of land, regardless of the state of record title, 
is notice to the world of the possessor's rights: 
An occupant's possession is actual notice of his title, and all persons with notice of such 
possession must at their peril take notice ofhis full title in the premises, no difference what the 
record shows. 
Tolandv. Corey, 24 P. 190 (Utah 1890)(emphasis added); see also, Neponset Land & Live-Stock Co. 
v. Dixon, 37 P. 573 (Utah 1894) (occupancy is sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry notice). This 
doctrine has been affirmed by the Utah appellate courts repeatedly, and at least as recently as the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision in Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Ut.App. 1987). 
Garco acknowledges that it had a duty of inquiry, but asserts that the inquiry that it made was 
sufficient under the circumstances (Garco's Brief, p. 18). Paul Kingston attested that on behalf of 
Garco, he relied on the seller's representations regarding the terms of the lease, as well as his own 
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personal beliefs regarding Reagan's customary business practices. (R.366-67,^7,9).16 Even if Mr. 
Kingston's testimony had been undisputed,17 Garco's choice to rely solely on its seller's statements 
rather than to contact Reagan to verify the validity of those statements did not divest Reagan of its real 
property interest. All the recording statute on which Garco has relied does is to provide notice ~ the 
statute does not affect the validity of documents between parties who have notice by means other than 
recordation. U.C.A. §57-3-102(3) (1998) ("This section does not affect the validity of a document with 
respect to the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document." 
(emphasis added)). With a duty to inquire, Garco had an obligation to make a FULL inquiry — i.e., to 
pick up the telephone and contact Reagan about the terms of its lease. Neponset, supra; Toland, supra. 
Garco asserts that its post-purchase discussions with Reagan also constitute evidence of 
adequate inquiry. (Garco's Brief, p. 18). Those discussions are irrelevant. In order for them to have 
been a part of Garco's inquiry, they needed to have been conducted prior to Garco's purchase of the 
property. See, 11 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser §454 (purchaser on duty of inquiry needs to 
make due and diligent inquiry or investigation before discharging duty to inquire) (cited at Garco's 
Brief at p. 18). 
17
 The facts relating to notice and inquiry as Garco has stated them have never been undisputed. 
Garco had advanced these "facts" for the first time just six days prior to the hearing on Reagan's 
summary judgment motion. Despite the untimeliness of the evidence, prior to the hearing, Reagan 
filed the affidavit of Garco's seller, J.Richard Lamont, who directly contradicted Paul Kingston's 
testimony, stating that he delivered a copy of the lease to Mr. Kingston and that Mr. Kingston was 
fully aware of the lease prior to Garco's purchase of the property (R.400-05). See, also, Affidavit of 
Douglas T. Hall (R.429-30), submitted in opposition to Garco's motion for summary judgment on 
Reagan's counterclaim. Given sufficient opportunity, Reagan would have disputed Garco's "facts" 
even further in opposing Garco's cross-motion for summary judgment on its own claim. But the 
"facts" regarding notice and inquiry were never properly before the trial court. Garco belatedly and 
untimely raised the "facts" some six days before the trial court granted Reagan's motion for summary 
judgment. With the exception of how they might apply to Reagan's counterclaim (which was later 
dismissed by stipulation - R.515-17), any issues raised by these "facts" were mooted by the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Reagan. See, Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 
1057 (Utah App. 1994) (case is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants). Unless the trial court were to have reinstated Garco's claims by setting aside the judgment 
it had already granted, consideration of Garco's cross-motion for summary judgment on its own 
claims against Reagan would have been meaningless. 
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Simply accepting the statements of the seller and then closing ones' eyes is not enough. The tenant's 
possession of the property requires the purchaser to ask both the seller and the tenant about the 
relationship - otherwise there is substantial potential for fraud against tenants with valid leases to real 
property. A buyer with actual notice of the lease could simply choose not to review the document or 
to contact the tenant, but to rely simply on whatever the seller stated. Regardless of whether the seller's 
statements were accurate, the buyer's choice would divest the tenant of its valuable property rights --
even when the buyer had actual knowledge of the lease. The recording statute does not have such an 
effect. Instead, the statute specifically indicates that its recording requirements do not affect the validity 
of documents with respect to anyone who has notice of the unrecorded document. U.C.A. §57-3-
102(3)(1998). 
Nor does Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan Ass 'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 
1987) support Garco's argument that the inquiry that Garco made was sufficient. In Diversified, the 
purchaser made inquiry of the very bank which later sought to have its mistakenly released lien 
enforced against the property. Id. at 1135. The bank initially advised the purchaser that the lien had, 
in fact, been properly released. Later the bank learned that it had made a mistake and recorded an 
affidavit stating that the release had been in error and that the trust deed was still in effect. Id. at 1135. 
In an action by the purchaser to quiet title against the bank, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court's ruling in favor of the bank. The Court of Appeals ruled that, having inquired of the bank 
initially, the purchaser did not have an obligation to follow up on what the bank had already stated -
for example, by demanding to see receipts or reconveyance instructions. Id. at 1137, fn. 5. The 
Diversified purchaser was entitled to rely on the statements of the very entity whose lien the purchaser 
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was seeking to avoid. But Garco never asked Reagan about the lease, although it is the encumbrance 
of Reagan's lease which Garco seeks to avoid. 
Garco's claim that its seller misrepresented the lease, even if true, might form the basis for a 
claim against Garco's seller, but it does not bind Reagan or change the terms of its tenancy. Nor did 
the seller's alleged representations relieve Garco of a duty to inquire with Reagan, as the person in 
possession, to determine the nature of the relationship. The seller and Garco cannot bind Reagan to any 
statements that the seller purportedly made to Garco. Those statements did not invalidate the lease. 
Having had notice of the lease, Garco purchased the property subject to the lease. 
5. Garco Presented No Evidence on Which Any Court Could Rule that the 
Lease was Unconscionable. 
Garco never asserted until its Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reconsider that 
it could avoid the lease on the basis of unconscionability or lack of consideration. Avoidance of the 
lease was not pleaded as a cause of action in Garco's Complaint, nor did Garco raise this issue in its 
opposition to Reagan's Motion for Summary Judgment or in support of its own (belated) cross-motion 
for summary judgment.18 
As a result of Garco's failure to timely raise this issue, no facts were ever developed as to 
whether, as Garco claims, the lease was unconscionable. Whether a contract is unconscionable is a 
mixed question of law and fact. Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah 1997). In 
18
 In its Reply Memo filed in support of the reconsideration motion, Garco asserted that it had, 
in fact, raised the issue of unconscionability as early as its own (belated) cross-motion for summary 
judgment. (R.469) But a review of Garco's memo filed in support of the cross-motion belies 
Garco's claim. At R.393-94, Garco argued that the non-compete clause was unenforceable as an 
"adhesion" contract. But Garco never once, until the Reply Memo, asserted that the entire lease 
itself was unconscionable. 
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the absence of sufficient evidence to find unconscionability, a claim of unconscionability can be 
dismissed as a matter of law. Id. at 825. 
Although Garco argues that various provisions of the lease are unreasonable, Garco introduced 
no evidence to support its argument. For example, Garco complains that the amount of the monthly 
rent payment was "paltry" (Garco's Brief, p. 20), but introduced no evidence to the trial court to 
compare the rent that the lease required Reagan to pay to the amount of rent charged under similar 
leases for outdoor advertising signs on similar real property. Garco further improperly asserts that the 
trial court found as a matter of law that the non-compete restriction was unreasonable (Garco's Brief, 
p. 20). Garco offered no evidence to the trial court on this issue, and its assertion of what the trial court 
ruled is incorrect. In fact, the trial court stated that it was "not of the view that [it] could rule as a matter 
of law that five years is a reasonable period [of time] for a restrictive covenant." (R.525, p.49). Because 
there were insufficient facts for the trial court to rule on the enforceability of the clause, the trial court's 
order simply indicated that there were factual issues preventing summary judgment on whether that 
clause was enforceable (R. 437, |3). Never having introduced any evidence to support its assertion of 
substantive unconscionability, Garco cannot protest that the trial court erred in rejecting this argument. 
As for the "indices of procedural unconscionability" that Garco asserts, the Woodhaven Court 
noted that "procedural unconscionability addresses whether the party had a reasonable opportunity to 
read and understand the terms of the contract." Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 924 P.2d at 925. 
Garco offered not a single fact to the trial court that Garco's predecessor was "underprivileged, 
unsophisticated, uneducated or illiterate," Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 
1042 (Utah 1985), that Garco's predecessor lacked "opportunity for meaningful negotiation," Id., that 
Garco's predecessor was offered the contract "on a take-it-or-leave-it basis," Id., or that Garco's 
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predecessor had any "lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation." Id. There was not a shred of 
evidence that Garco's predecessor did not wholly and completely agree to each and every term of the 
lease. Garco did not plead procedural unconscionability, nor did Garco offer any evidence to support 
such a claim. 
Finally, with regard to Garco's claim that the lease lacked consideration, even if Garco had 
raised the issue before its final reply memorandum on reconsideration of summary judgment, Garco's 
claim is invalid. Ignoring the regulatory climate in which Reagan operates, including the spacing 
requirements of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, Garco argues that for a "pittance," Reagan could 
have used the entirety of Garco's property to erect advertising signs (Garco's Brief, p. 20). Ignoring 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as well as the reality that an outdoor advertising sign along the 
1-15 corridor is so valuable that Reagan would never intentionally choose to display no advertising copy 
on the sign, Garco argues that Reagan could unilaterally choose to reduce the lessor's income to 
effectively nothing (Garco's Brief, p. 20). Garco's arguments are nothing but unbridled speculation. 
To the extent that any of these arguments were even before the trial court, they were correctly rejected. 
6. As Reagan Did Not Claim Possession of the Property After It Removed Its 
Sign, Garco's Claim For Unlawful Detainer Was Properly Dismissed. 
For the same reasons the trial court was correct in rejecting Garco's trespass claims, the trial 
court properly dismissed Garco's unlawful detainer claim. As set forth at length above, Reagan had no 
obligation to remove any of its property at the termination of the lease, including the foundation. It 
was undisputed on summary judgment that Reagan removed the sign face and poles from Garco's 
property in June 1995 (R.191) and moved its outdoor advertising operation to the Mollerup property 
(Garco's Brief, p. 11 ^|22). Thereafter, Reagan did not conduct any outdoor advertising on Garco's 
property, and did not claim any right to possession. The foundation that remained was flat (within 1/4 
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inch of being level to the ground), and does not interfere with Garco's access to the building nor 
utilization for parking (R. 133,1(25; R. 144-45, 146, 168) (see, also, Appendix 1). The unlawful detainer 
statutes are intended to provide a summary remedy to resolve separate claims of rights to possession 
of property. Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100, 105 (Utah 1944). Reagan claimed no right to 
possession after June 1995. Based on these facts and the law concerning the foundation, the trial court 
properly found that there were no material issues of fact as to when Reagan returned possession of the 
property to Garco. 
It was further undisputed that Garco did not serve a Notice of Unlawful Detainer until more than 
a year later, on July 29, 1996 (R.257). U.C.A. §78-36-3 requires service of such a notice as a pre-
requisite to maintenance of an action for unlawful detainer. U.C.A. §78-36-3 also requires that the 
defendant remain in possession of the property after service of the notice and expiration of the requisite 
time period. Having relinquished possession of the property to Garco more than a year prior to being 
served with the Notice of Unlawful Detainer, Reagan was not, as a matter of law, guilty of an unlawful 
detainer. The trial court's ruling in dismissing Garco's claim for unlawful detainer was correct. 
D. THE LAW DOES NOT ALLOW THE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
ONCE ALL SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED. 
In the absence of recovery on any of its claims, Garco's claim for punitive damages was 
properly dismissed. U.C.A. §78-18-1. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the trial court's initial order is not on appeal, the trial court committed no error in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Reagan, dismissing Garco's claims. Nor did the trial court 
commit error in striking portions of Garco's reply memorandum submitted in support of its motion to 
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reconsider that initial grant of summary judgment. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying Garco's reconsideration motion. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
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APPENDIX 1 
[MS. VAN FRANK]: I think just to 
give the Court some context for this, I went 
out yesterday, in between doing laundry and 
grocery shopping, and took some pictures of 
what it is we're talking about, and I'm just 
going to offer them for illustrative purposes 
and you can see what the issues in this 
lawsuit are all about. 
What you will see there is a door, 
and in front of the door there is a ~ there is a 
concrete circle. You can see it's very, very 
close to the foundation of the building. The 
concrete circle is the cap that Reagan put on 
top of the foundation when they removed the 
sign. 
I believe Garco has since asphalted 
around that, and I believe, based on Mr. 
Kingston's testimony, that that would be 
new asphalt this summer. But you can see 
how close the foundation is to the building 
and you can see that this is what is being 
complained of as being trespass. 
(R.541,pp.5-6). 
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U.P.C. Inc dba Garco Industrial Park 
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R.O.A. General Inc, dba Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Dewey Reagan, 
William Reagan, Doug Hall 
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 
Case Number: 2:98cvl49S 
This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a 
decision has been rendered. 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED 
that the first and second claims of the plaintiff are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs 
remaining state law claim which is dismissed without prejudice. 
Qr, 
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a GARCO ) Case No. 2:98-CV-0149-S 
INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., d/b/a 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
DEWEY REAGAN; WILLIAM REAGAN; 
DOUG HALL; DOES 1-10, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants R.O.A. General, Inc. and William Reagan ("Reagan") 
move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R± Civ. P~. 
12(b)(6)1 for failure to state a claim for antitrust violation 
because their conduct as alleged is protected by the "state action" 
immunity doctrine. Defendant Dewey Reagan joins in the motion. 
1Plaintiff has filed an objection and motion to strike 
defendants' exhibit to reply memorandum, apparently urging that the 
exhibits are inconsistent with a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. Because 
plaintiff's pleading does not strictly comport with DUCivR 7-1, the 
court will not address it. The court, however, has not considered 
the materials attached to defendants' reply memorandum and the same 
are excluded for purposes of defendants' motion to dismiss. 
ADI^IMAI 
MEMORANDUM DECIS-IONb __ 
) - ^ -1 
* o r 
- 9? "; 
Plaintiff U.P.C., Inc., d/b/a Garco Industrial Park ("Garco") 
owns and operates storage units on land situated next to 1-15 in 
Salt Lake County. From 1975 to 1995 Reagan had an outdoor 
advertising sign on Garco's property and paid rent to Garco and its 
predecessor-in-interest. In 1995, Reagan removed its sign from 
Garco's property and installed it on adjacent property. Because 
state regulation requires five hundred foot spacing between outdoor 
advertising signs, Garco was precluded from contracting to have 
another sign erected on its property. Garco alleges violation of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Utah Antitrust Act. 
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 
When a motion to dismiss is filed-, the burden is on the movant 
to prove that the non-movant can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle ±*im to reliefs Shoultz v. Monfort 
of Colorado, Inc.
 f 754 F.2d 318 {10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 475 
U.S. 1044 (1986); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). The court 
is to presume for purposes of considering the motion that all 
allegations by the non-movant are true and all reasonable infer-
ences are made in favor of the non-movant. La£oy ,v, HMO Colorado, 
988 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1993); Miree v, DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 
(1977). Legal conclusions, deductions, and opinions couched as 
2 
facts are, however, not given such a presumption. Mitchell v. 
King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976); Swanson v, Bixler, 750 F.2d 
810 (10th Cir. 1984) . The likelihood that the plaintiff may or may 
not prevail at trial is immaterial at the time of decision on a 
motion to dismiss. Boudeloche v. Grow Them. Coatinga Corp., 728 
F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1984) . 
III. DISCUSSION 
Reagan asserts that its alleged anticompetitive conduct is. 
immune from federal antitrust laws by virtue of the state action 
immunity doctrine. Garco urges that- application of the relevant 
state action test to the facts presented establishes that Reagan is. 
not entitled to immunity. 
The state action immunity doctrine has been explained as 
follows: 
The "state action immunity" doctrine originated in Parker 
v. Brown. 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 
(1943), and "'exempts qualifying state and local govern-
ment regulation from federal antitrust, even if the 
regulation at issue compels an otherwise clear violation 
of the federal antitrust laws.'" Cost Management Services 
v. Washington Natural Gas Co. 99 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 
1996)(quoting Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The 
Law of Competition and its Practice § 20.2, at 673 (West 
1994)). Although the doctrine was aimed at protecting 
state legislatures and state supreme courts acting in 
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their legislative capacities, it can provide protection 
to other individuals or entities acting pursuant to state 
authorization. £ja£ Hoover v. Ronwinf 466 U.S. 558, 568 
104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995, 80 L. Ed.2d 590 (1984). In such 
situations, however, "closer analysis is required" to 
determine whether antitrust immunity is appropriate. 
Id. ; Porter Testing Laboratory v. Board of Regents, 993 
F.2d 768, 770 (10th Cir.), oeZL. denied, 510 U.S. 932, 
114 S. Ct. 344, 126 L. Ed.2d 309 (1993). 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assfn v. Midcal 
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 100 S. Ct. 937, 63 L. Ed.2d 233 
(1980), the Supreme Court established a two-part test to 
determine whether alleged anticompetitive conduct on the 
part of a private party is immunized under the state 
action immunity doctrine. First, "the challenged 
restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy.1" Id. at 105, 100 S. 
Ct. at 943 (quoting City of Lafayette y, Louisiana Power 
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410, 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1135, 55 
L. Ed.2d 364 (1978)). Second, "the policy must be 
'actively supervised1 by the State itself." Id. 
Application of this "rigorous" test insures that Parker 
immunity is applied only where the "private party's 
anticompetitive conduct j^romotesi-state^ Jgolicy, ratgher 
than merely the party's individual interests." Patrick 
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101£-108 S. Qt. _i§58, JL663,: 10_0; 
L. Ed.2d 83 (1988) . 
Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc., Ill F.3d 1495, 1498-1499 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997). 
A. Clear articulation test 
As noted, the first prong of the state action immunity test is 
whether the restraint at issue is clearly expressed as state 
policy. Id. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.5(3) (a) prohibits outdoor 
advertising signs from being erected along certain highways within 
4 
five hundred feet of another outdoor advertising sign. Jleagan 
urges that the obvious foreseeable result of this regulation is 
that competition within five hundred feet of any existing sign 
would be suppressed and, thus, the clear articulation test is met. 
Plaintiff on the other hand argues that it is not enough for a 
state regulation to have incidental anticompetitive effects. 
Rather plaintiff urges that there must be an actual clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace 
competition. The court disagrees. See City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991) ("[iJt is 
enough, we have held, if suppression of competition is the 
'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes"). £££ also 
Porter Testing Laboratory v, Board of Regents for the Oklahoma 
Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, 993 F.2d 768, 770 (10th 
Cir.), ££xt. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993) (anticompetitive conduct 
was "foreseeable result of authorizing a nonprofit university to 
conduct soil testing"). 
Although plaintiff complains that Reagan has manipulated the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act to its own advantage, the gravamen of 
plaintiff's complaint is the five hundred foot restriction clearly 
mandated by state law. Among the clear purposes of the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act is "the regulation of outdoor advertising 
5 
consistent with zoning principles and standards _and the public 
policy of this State in providing public safety, health, welfare, 
convenience and enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public 
investment in highways, to preserve the natural-scenic beauty of 
land bordering on highways . . .". Utah Code Ann. § 27-12j-136.2.2 
Zoning regulations have the foreseeable result of impacting 
competition. 
The very purpose of zoning regulation is _to displace 
unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly 
has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, 
particularly on the part of new entrants. A municipal 
ordinance restricting the size, location, and spacing of 
billboards (surely a common form of zoning) necessarily 
protects existing billboards against some competition 
from newcomers. 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
373 (1991). The court concludes therefore, that the first prong of 
the state action immunity test is satisfied. 
2Plaintiff contends that principles of federalism underlying 
the state action immunity doctrine have limited application here 
because this is a "purely private action, for purely private 
anticompetitive purposes, within a framework of a federal highway 
beautification program enforced with state cooperation." Plain-
tiff's Memo in Opp. at 11. Although the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act serves to ratify an agreement entered into between Utah and the 
federal government, the Act's clearly stated purpose is the 
regulation of outdoor advertising consistent with state policy. 
6 
B. Active state involvement test 
The second prong of the state action immunity test is that the 
expressed state policy restraining competitive conduct be actively 
supervised by the State. Zimomra, 111 F.3d at 1499. "[T]he active 
supervision prong of the Midcal test Requires that the state 
officials have and exercise power to review particular 
anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that 
fail to accord with state policy.'" Id. (quoting Patrick v, Burget, 
486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)). The purpose of the active supervision 
inquiry "is to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient 
independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates 
or prices have been established as..a product -of deliberate estate 
intervention, not simply hy agreement among ^ private parties.41 
Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance fCo„, 504:UuS 
621, 634-635 (1992) . Mere potential for state supervision is not 
enough. Id. at 638. 
Plaintiff argues that the State did not actively supervise 
defendants' removal and placement of its outdoor advertising sign 
on the adjacent property, and at most the State "rubber stamped" 
Reagan's request to move its sign. 
7 
Under Utah's extensive regulatory scheme for outdoor advertis-
ing, the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") must issue a 
permit prior to installation of any outdoor sign. Utah. .Code Ann. 
§ 27-12-136.7. No permit may be issued for erection of a sign 
within five hundred feet of a permitted sign location. Xd. ; Utah 
Admin. R. 933-2. Permits are "issued only for signs lawfully 
erected or to be lawfully erected". Utah Admin. R. 933-2-4(3). 
"Written proof of lease or consent from site owner to erect or 
maintain an outdoor advertising sign must be furnished by the 
applicant at the time of application". Xd. at 933-2-4 (1L). 
Provision is made for removal of illegal signs. Xd. at 933-2-8. 
Provision is made for hearings regarding the legality of a sign. 
Xd. Based on Utahfs regulatory scheme, illustrated by the 
foregoing examples, the court concludes that there is substantial 
state participation in the conduct complained of to satisfy the 
second prong of the state action immunity test. The court 
concludes, therefore, that Reagan is entitled to state action 
immunity for plaintiff's Sherman Act claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed, Reagan's motion to dismiss is 
granted. Accordingly, plaintiff's first and second claims based on 
8 
the Sherman Antitrust Act are dismissed for failure to state a 
claim. The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plain-
tiff's third claim based on state law, and the same is dismissed 
without prejudice. 
this rf* day of ^JH^T—, PiATTTP) *" ^  "" "" ' f r\z*\r CM -**>*» • * •£>»* # X - 7 - 7 b 
BY THE COURT: 
>3= 
DAVID SAM 
CHIEF JUDGE 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
e. . . r , s o n n e t e d document is c i t w 
Date: 
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BEESLEY SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY # 0257 
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation 
310 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
A Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff,and Respondent 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION. : 
Defendant and Appellant, : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, HOOD 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a California 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C84-2857 
Judge David S. Young 
Notice is hereby given pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah 
i rtfV?2h 
Rules of Applelate Procedure, that Salt Lake City Corporation 
hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the 
Summary Judgment of August 31, 1985 and the Order of February 3, 
1987 entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings 
presiding. 
DATED this {_+ day of February, 1987. 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
<^\ \ yg*cri\., 
Stanford P. Fitts 
Attorney for Ap>pleant 
310 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^O03^: 
." u~\ 
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Z\ 
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DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS £ WEST 
Attorney for Defendant 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, HOOD 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
Cali fornia corporation, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C84-2857 
Judge Judith M. Bi l l ings 
The th i rd party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on regular ly for hearing before the 
Honorable Judith M. B i l l i ngs , D i s t r i c t Judge, on the 2nd day 
of August, 1985, such defendant being represented by t h e i r 
a t torney of record David A. Reeve, and th i rd party p l a i n t i f f 
Salt Lake City Corporation being represented by the i r j^^^TS 
attorney Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., and the plaintiff and third 
party defendant James Constructors, Inc. being represented 
by their attorney of record C. Reed Brown. The court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, together with third 
party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Marc Laulhere and the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and 
having reviewed the reply affidavit of Arthur L. Keesler, 
Jr., attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, and having 
heard arguments from the respective counsel, and based upon 
the motion of third party defendant's attorney, David A. 
Reeve, the court does hereby enter the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
That all causes of action brought by the third party 
plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation against third party 
defendant Hood Corporation are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. Further, both parties hereto are to bear their 
own attorney's fees and costs of court incurred herein. 
DATED this Hf day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
°EPUTY< 
Approved as to fnrm*^*^-
:E M. BILLINGS 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
<$/£& ATTEST H. DIXON HINDLEY 
ARTHUR L. KEESLEA, J R . / / 
At torney for Sa l t Lake/Vity 
Corpora t io r 
ida&L. 
nOOV <CA3 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Defendant 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
FILED IN CLEPKS OFFJCC 
Salt LaS» C?«T*v'Utsh 
FEB 31987 
Cjouty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a 
Nevada corporation; HOOD 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED ORDER 
Civil No. C-84-2857 
Judge Judith Billings 
Salt Lake City Corporation's (SLCC) Motion for 
Reconsideration and Leave to Amend Their Complaint as to the 
defendant Hood Corporation, came on regularly for hearing on the 
22nd day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Judith Billings, 
District Court Judge. SLCC being represented by their attorney^,\r-E C/?\ 
of record, Wilfred A. Beasley and Stanford P. Fitts, the Hood ^  /'r ^ :\V£ 
Corporation being represented by their attorney of record David 
A. Reeve, James Constructors, Inc. being represented by their 
attorneys of record, Jay Jensen and C. Reed Brown, and Industrial 
Indemnity Company being represented by their attorney of record 
C. Reed Brown. The court having heard the arguments of counsel 
with regard to the procedural aspects of SLCC's motion for 
reconsideration, and having heard arguments with regard to their 
motion for leave to amend their complaint, and having reviewed 
all pleadings and memorandum submitted in support and in 
opposition to said motions, and the court having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Salt Lake City Corporations motion to reconsider, 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), the prior entry of summary judgment 
against the Hood Corporation is denied. 
2. That Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to amend their 
Complaint to add a cause of action under the alter ego theory, 
against the Hood Corporation, is denied. 
3. That the prior Summary Judgment entered on the 21st day 
of August, 1985, in favor of the Hood Corporation, is hereby 
certified and directed by the court to be a final judgment, for 
appeal purposes, inasmuch as the court makes an express finding 
that there is no reason for delay. 
DATED this g- day of January, 1987. 
*w> 
>,<-?o* 
BY THE C O U R T ; 
ATTEST 
K DIXON HWDLEY 
deputy Clar* 
JUDITH BILLINGS 
•District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, this /j day of 
January, 1987 to the following: 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Stanford P. Pitts 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation 
310 Deseret Book Building iSEnm^IHATTHIS|SATRUEC0PvoP 
40 East South Temple «s\^^ 
Sal t Lake City , Utah 84111 COUNTY^ATEOFirSu SALT u« 
DATE 
C. Reed Brown 
H I N T Z E & BROWN DEPUTY COuAf C1£RK *•**&.'• 
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc. | z%Si&& w 
and Industrial Indemnity Company 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Jay Jensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 / / 
*&*£$ 
APPENDIX 4 
AGREEMENT made this 
JGH LOCATION LEASE 
hereinafter called th* L*ssor» and R ^ L G A N OUTDOOR ADVBRTl3iN<£<NG, a Utah corporation, 
harelnnfter called the Leasee, ^ 
I. That, for dm considersdon hereinafter mencton*d, tha Lessor doc« hereby gnat to the Lessee, and tU assigns and 
mccaMoni cbe exclusive right to uso ehe following described property for the purpoa* oi erecting painted, printed, or ulumi^  
aatad advertising signs, including necessary •truxrture*, davice* and eoaoecdotu, tu-^it: on the ground, on builc^ng^ eractj J 
or to bo erected, or on rooit of any such buildings upoa tho following described lend, located ia tho county ol 
JSeaee of Utah, and mo** particularly described u follows, to-wit. 
LOCATION: — 
JStaeo of Uuh, and B O « part 
'<*£&* ^€^f^/^^^^u^^y 
.jf&Ujd^r^^ 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: 
M M «*4 bound* U«*i datcrifUon lucnbiagt£« tocaUan.) ( I r y i «*7 p irn o* liua i»Mf\nacai. MbMquCAt ta k» uautioA. 
2. Tba tana of this leas* shall enenmrnr* on _ _ _ 
and dull conttnn* on tho tamo term* for an Initial period of ton years from the data 
tba £&b~ ,day of JS 
advertising purpose* oa tha herein daacribed premises; notwithstanding tha foregoing, it U further understood and agreed that 
if tho first structure ia not placed within twerv* month* froa execution of thu agreemei 
sign itruccura (or 
.. .. _ 1 
ent, that the fint anniversary darn shall 
bo the commencement date of tha lease tad rent- _
 m 
3. Las*** thai] pay to die Leaaor rental la tha amount of $... yaar payable on a (MoathlyfQua«fc.itr) 
S53aw*i) basis. Prior to construction and during mxch ansa a* no advertisinjc copies art being dLfplajasl- *m tne 
premia** by I/»sce, tho rant shall be at tha raw 4 be* percent uC tho annual rental. 
•. Lessor grand to the Lease* privilege and option to continue this 1MM for a like period on die tarn* tad condi 
dona harein wt out; laid renewal ipail be daenwd ro have baaA axorcised ic* «u addiUonal period by dia continuing ia tha 
possession of laid premises and me paymant of rant. Lessor agr**s at die termination of ti^ia !***• for fiv* xaarejiot to * 
tha datniaad premises to any outdoor advertiser other than Lease*. ^+i&x/?g4u4fy*£*%*>****>&sL - ^ S . 
5. In tha case the Ptderal. Stabs, Municipal or other public £{&o1iryu&ufruo7? igf rumor regulations H  adt&&Tt tf lTWc£ca ^ y Eia  
. maintinanca or ooeradon of ngaa, to _ 
, or Ln caae tha view of tho premises ahail beoocno obatruetcd tho Liitea may tar 
which ihail havn tha affect of reitricdng tha toe*duo, coo*true doc, p ti n ai to diminiah tha 
value of laid prenutaa for adveruiing purpoaaa ic i x ' * " 
ruinate thia leaaa upon giving tho Laoor thirty daji wtittan node*. 
- 6. It ia understood that nraha avant of the termination of this lea**- under any of th* previaiott herein "tat oat, any 
camtai which hai b*ca paid ia advance by the Laaaa* ahall be repaid by tho Leaaor. 
' 7. Tb« Lfleieo it and thai! remain the owner of ait dgna and uenproveenanta placnd 
ha* d>« right to remove or change th* aim* at Any dm*, 
8. Th* Leaaor represents th*t he ia the owaer»tenajic-ag«nt 
to ezacuba due leaac. 
9. In th* evont th* Luior ahouid default in any of tho covenants and agr«*mcna contained herein. Leaaor agrees 
to pay all coatt and aqpenjoa that may aria* from enforcing Uiii agreement either by suit ot otherwise, including reasonahlo 
attorney foea. 
by Lease* oo said property and 
of the premises above described and has the authority 
Lessor agree* that ho, hii tenants, agents, employeei, or other persons acting in bis bahaif, shall not pi ! . . . -_ o. .. -_i. __. u.
 L .^ ._ M ^ ^^y obstruct th* view of tain any object on die pxenufe* or oo any orijhborlaft preouses which would 
structures. 
Ideate* ma. 
harein paid to th* rum of Five DoiUrs per year so 
l l . Lessor iVafl •JLgrtct, caus* to be. 
or main* 
s 
such an obstruction occur* th* Least* has th* option of reoulring tha Letaor to remove said obstTuctsoo, of 
Leas y itself ramoveth* oUttucuoq charging the cost of Mud rtmoyii to toe Lassor, or th* Lesie* may rtduca th* rantai jf v* ' 
such obstruction eondauea. 
wul extend above tha parapet 
wail of Lessor's \*1MnMtfW>*^+rU'i?&'£*l 
12. Tbia Lease shall 'c&nuinite'th* sol* agreement of th* parties relating to the lease of th* above described premiaes. 
rty will be bound by any itat -'— ! — ' — - ^ ' ^ 
promise* are set forth specifically in thu 
Neither part  tmanu, warranties, or promucs, oral or written, unless such statements, wsmatses or 
' ' i i 1 ' * 
13. This ajrxeeexncnt ihail inure to th* benefit oTjmd b* binding upon their heiri, personal representatives, lucceasors, 
and assigns of di* panics hereto. / 
IN Vf lTN£5af V/HEAEp?, ^pa^t ie s ;hmto have set their handi the day and year Hrst above written. 
ife 
SS' 
_^5S^04-«&e=: 
Addft»s 
Scat* AS} 
$6v\uuj\ 
%#* 
00 02 
APPENDIX 5 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
The Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and 
the Defendant's Motion to Strike, both having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
U.C.J.Admin., the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the file and for good cause otherwise 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike Points "B," "D," "E," "F," and "II" of Garco's 
Reply Memo is granted. 
Third Judicial District 
MY 0 1 1998 
8fti- S 
*;SM UttDUty CT5& 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint is denied. 
DATED this V day of Apd, 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
UdrfJ r&Zin'^ie<ts 
Mark Hansen 
Attorney forYlaintiff 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this 3-1 day of April, 1998, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
-7 : ^ 
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APPENDIX 6 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS.
 J 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. ] 
> ORDER AND 
> JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the plaintiffs 
complaint having come on for hearing before the Hon. William B. Bohling on Monday, November 
24, 1997, the plaintiff being represented by its counsel, F. Mark Hansen, the defendant being 
represented by its counsel, Leslie Van Frank of and for COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 
the Court having reviewed the file, including the pleadings, affidavits, and references to deposition 
testimony, having heard the argument of counsel, and for good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
DEC 2 9 1997 
1. The Court finds that there are no material factual disputes with respect to 
whether there was a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. The undisputed 
evidence is that there was a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. The face 
of the lease document itself does not require removal of the sign foundation of which plaintiff has 
complained. Nor does the face of the lease document require that the defendant restore the property 
to its former condition upon vacating the property. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant did not 
and has not trespassed on plaintiffs property by leaving the sign foundation in place when defendant 
removed the sign face and poles from the plaintiffs property. Plaintiffs First Cause of Action is 
therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The Court further finds that there are no material factual disputes as to 
whether defendant returned possession of the property to the plaintiff prior to plaintiffs service of 
a Notice to Quit. Defendant returned possession to plaintiff when defendant completed removal of 
the sign faces and sign structure from plaintiffs property no later than June 19, 1995. Plaintiffs 
Notice of Unlawful Detainer was served more than a year later, on July 29,1996. As a matter of law, 
defendant is not liable for unlawful detainer of the property, having returned possession of the 
property to plaintiff more than a year prior to the plaintiffs Notice of Unlawful Detainer. Plaintiffs 
Second Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The Court finds that there are factual issues with respect to whether the five-
year non-compete clause in the lease constitutes a reasonable period of time, and does not rule on 
the issue of whether the non-compete clause is enforceable. 
2 
4. With respect to plaintiffs Third Cause of Action for intentional interference 
with economic relations, in order to prevail on its claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant's alleged 
acts were undertaken either (1) for a predominant improper purpose, or (2) by improper means, and 
that these acts caused injury to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that, because of the 500 foot spacing 
requirements of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, defendant's placement of the new sign on the 
neighboring property prevented plaintiff from leasing its property to any other outdoor advertiser. 
However, even if the Court implies as true that the plaintiffs purpose in locating the sign as it did 
on the nighboring property was to prevent plaintiff from erecting its own sign, there is no evidence 
that any injury to plaintiff occasioned by defendant's move of the sign to the neighboring property 
was an end in and of itself, designed to harm plaintiff merely for the sake of injury alone. Instead, 
the defendant's move of the sign to its present location constituted legitimate competitive activity, 
consistent with an effort by defendant to achieve the long-range economic goal of maximizing its 
profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling competitive activity on the 
plaintiffs property. Thus, there is no evidence of improper purpose. The Court also finds that there 
are no disputed facts material to a determination that defendant did not act by improper means. At 
the hearing, plaintiff abandoned its arguments that the lease negotiations and the defendant's threats 
of legal redress in the event plaintiff utilized self-help in removing the sign constituted improper 
means. With respect to the plaintiffs arguments that defendant utilized improper means in obtaining 
its permit to move the sign to the neighboring property, the Court notes that it is undisputed that after 
lengthy lease negotiations between plaintiff and defendant, on February 23, 1995, plaintiff advised 
3 
defendant that it had "elected to pursue other options" and demanded that defendant immediately 
remove the sign. Defendant contracted with the neighboring property owner on April 20, 1995, and 
applied to UDOT to move the sign shortly thereafter. There is no evidence that plaintiff took any 
substantial steps during that interim period to attempt to secure its own permit for a competing sign. 
Nor is there any evidence before the Court that the defendant's R-407 permit was improperly granted 
or that the defendant's two signs being erected at the same time for some three weeks caused any 
injury to plaintiff. Therefore, there is no evidence that defendant acted by improper means in 
moving its sign to the neighboring property or that the defendant's act in moving the sign was the 
cause of plaintiffs inability to procure its own permit. In the absence of evidence of improper 
purpose or improper means, and in the absence of any evidence that defendant's acts caused any 
injury to the plaintiff, plaintiffs Third Cause of Action must be and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
5. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that defendant engaged in price 
discrimination or sold anything at less than cost. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 
the Unfair Practices Act. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
6. Plaintiff having failed to prevail on any of its substantive causes of action, the 
Fifth Cause of Action for punitive damages is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4 
DATED this ; ) day of-Nevemfeer, 1997. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BY THE£OURT 
Hon. William B. Bohling -
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this c34 day of November, 1997, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
F:\LESLIE\NOV97\ROAUPC.ORD 
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APPENDIX 7 
no ^ 
F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
FILED 
Pf! 12: 30 98 JUr! - \ PM ,o. ^ 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
i NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial 
Park, through the above-named counsel, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the 
Honorable William B. Bohling entered in this matter on May 1, 1998. The appeal is taken from 
the entire order. 
/ DATED this day of June, 1998. 
I certify on June 
mail to: 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, 1998 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-class 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
